

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



*An American Quarterly
Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

October
1953

Vol. 12, No. 4

Price \$2.00

Contributors to This Issue

DAVID SHUB is the author of *Lenin: a Biography*, New York, 1948; he has written on Russian affairs for the *New York Times Magazine*, the *Yale Review*, the *New Leader*, *The New Republic*, and other periodicals.

ABRAHAM ASCHER is a candidate for the Ph.D. degree in History at Columbia University and has done free-lance work for the Voice of America.

DEMING BROWN is Assistant Professor of Russian Language and Literature and Chairman of the Committee on Russian Civilization at Northwestern University.

C. BICKFORD O'BRIEN is a member of the academic staff of the University of California's Institute of Slavic Studies and Chairman of the Department of History and Political Science at the University of California at Davis; he is the author of *Russia Under Two Tsars, 1682-1689*, 1952.

GEORGE C. GUINS, Lecturer in Political Science and Russian at the Institute of Slavic Studies, University of California, Berkeley, is the author of several books (in Russian) in the fields of law, government, and sociology, and of numerous articles in American scholarly magazines.

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia
Past and Present

Vol. 12

OCTOBER 1953

No. 4

★ ★ ★

| | |
|---|-----|
| Kropotkin and Lenin, <i>David Shub</i> | 227 |
| The Kornilov Affair, <i>Abraham Ascher</i> | 235 |
| O. Henry in Russia, <i>Deming Brown</i> | 253 |
| Russia and Turkey, 1677-1681: The Treaty of Bakhchisarai, <i>C. Bickford O'Brien</i> | 259 |
| The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., <i>George C. Guins</i> | 269 |

BOOK REVIEWS

| | |
|---|-----|
| Russia and Her Colonies, <i>by</i> Walter Kolarz, <i>John S. Reshetar, Jr.</i> | 279 |
| Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, <i>ed. by</i> Jane Degras, <i>Donald G. Bishop</i> | 280 |
| Minerals—A Key to Soviet Power, <i>by</i> Demitri B. Shimkin, <i>Harry Schwartz</i> | 283 |

Continued on Page II

| | |
|---|-----|
| Der Dialektische Materialismus, Seine Geschichte und Sein System in der Sowjetunion, <i>by</i> Gustav A. Wetter, <i>Hans Kohn</i> | 283 |
| Moscow and East Rome. A Political Study of the Relations of Church and State in Muscovite Russia, <i>by</i> William K. Medlin, <i>Valentine Tschebotarioff Bill</i> | 285 |
| Monachisme et Monastères Russes, <i>by</i> M. J. Rouët de Journal, <i>N. Bock</i> | 286 |
| Freedom and the Tragic Life; A Study in Dostoevsky, <i>by</i> Vyacheslav Ivanov, <i>René Fueloep-Miller</i> | 288 |

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt

Editor

Michael Karpovich

Warren B. Walsh

Alexis Wiren

The aim of "The Russian Review" is to present a non-partisan interpretation of Russian history, civilization, and culture. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article in this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

Books for review and correspondence concerning reviews should be sent to Professor Warren B. Walsh, 113 Maxwell, Syracuse University, Syracuse 10, New York.

Copyright 1953, and published quarterly in January, April, July, and October by "The Russian Review," 215 West 23rd Street, New York 11, N. Y. Subscription rates: \$4.00 a year in the United States; Canada \$4.50; foreign \$5.00, single copy \$1.00. The contents of this publication cannot be reprinted without the permission of the editors. Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.

Kropotkin and Lenin

BY DAVID SHUB

IN the first years after the Bolshevik coup d'état, many Americans, and a few Europeans as well, confused Bolshevism with anarchism. In 1917, Lenin had preached the complete destruction of bourgeois state forms and the establishment of a workers' and peasants' republic based on local soviets, similar to the local communes of which the anarchists had dreamed. Dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin had said, was only a temporary expedient, necessary to destroy the bourgeois state and wipe out forces hostile to the new order; when the revolution was complete, the state would gradually disappear. Some of the methods, moreover, which Lenin employed in destroying the old order were similar to those preached by Mikhail Bakunin, the father of Russian anarchism. As a result, a majority of anarchists in Russia, and a large proportion of anarchists abroad, sympathized with the Bolsheviks during their first half-decade in power. Only with the extension of Bolshevik terror to anarchists and the later suppression of the Kronstadt revolt did this sympathy begin to waver.

It is an indisputable fact, however, that the greatest of all the anarchists—Peter Kropotkin—opposed Lenin from the start and considered the Bolshevik ideology more hostile to anarchism than so-called “bourgeois liberalism.” The moral gulf that separated Bolshevism from democratic socialism also divided it from the anarchism-communism conceived by Kropotkin. Nothing more dramatically illustrates this basic hostility than the relations between Kropotkin and Lenin during the first years of the Revolution. In the meeting and correspondence between these two men, the details of which have only recently become clear, may be viewed the monumental divergence between a philosophy of the free individual spirit, many of whose insights will still play a part in building a better life, and a philosophy of institutional subjugation which, for all its present vaunted power, is doomed to oblivion.

No one could better represent Bolshevism at such a confrontation than Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, for in his mind all its basic elements were conceived and through his iron will they were brought to fruition. And Peter Kropotkin, the Russian prince turned geologist, explorer, historian, and revolutionary, embodied the highest ideals

toward which his creed strove—science, art, literature, philosophy, music were all within his ken, and the moral force of his loving personality was a legend even among his bitterest foes.

Both men had been abroad when the Russian people overthrew the tsarist autocracy, Kropotkin in England, Lenin in Switzerland. Both had had to flee the tsarist police many years before. But where the 47-year-old Lenin was known only to a small circle of European socialists, Kropotkin, at 75, had been a world figure for two decades. His scientific articles had already won him scholarly acclaim when, in the 1880's, writing in the *London Times*, *The Nineteenth Century*, the *North American Review*, and other periodicals, he had done more than any other man to awaken the Western world to the realities of Russian life under Tsarism. In 1882, the French government, pressed by its burgeoning *entente* with the Romanovs, had arrested him in connection with anarchist violence in Lyons (in which he had no part); a petition asking his release was signed by Victor Hugo, Herbert Spencer, Algernon Charles Swinburne, and leading contributors to the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. When Kropotkin was sentenced to five years in prison, the historian Ernest Renan and the French Academy of Science each offered Kropotkin the use of their libraries. (His French prosecutor, meanwhile, was decorated by Tsar Alexander III.)

Kropotkin's *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*, published in 1899, brought him international admiration, and the venerable Scandinavian critic Georg Brandes stated flatly in its preface, "There are at this moment only two great Russians who think for the Russian people, and whose thoughts belong to mankind—Leo Tolstoy and Peter Kropotkin." When, in 1901, Kropotkin exposed in the *North American Review* the repressive character of the tsarist school system, Pobedonostsev, Nicholas II's chief adviser, felt compelled to answer him personally.

Kropotkin's own warm and tender character (he was as at ease with children and animals as with political groups) had a marked influence on the direction of the anarchist movement. Where Bakunin had been predominantly negative—concentrating on the task of destroying existing state coercion, Kropotkin addressed his thoughts to the positive program for building a society based on free cooperation. Both as a physical scientist and as a social theorist, he postulated another law just as important as that of the struggle for existence: he called it the law of "mutual aid." The solidarity of people—their natural inclination to work out together, unhampered

by coercion, the most satisfactory approach to their common problems—was the foundation of Kropotkin's philosophical anarchism.

In that anarchism, no privileged part was to be played by "professional revolutionists." Rather, Kropotkin believed that social justice could only be achieved through the conscious cooperation of all the people—workers, farmers, tradesmen, and intelligentsia. Thus, while personally intimate with the leaders of Russia's People's Will movement, Kropotkin disapproved of their idea of making a revolution *for* the people. A decent and durable social order, he said, could only emerge through the efforts of the people themselves.

Despite these doubts about other strains of Russian radicalism, Kropotkin bitterly opposed isolating anarchism as the only true anti-tsarist faith, waging war against all infidels. He greeted liberal, Socialist Revolutionary, and Social Democratic foes of despotism as allies in the common struggle for basic political liberties. The dangers of narrow sectarianism and of "professional revolutionists" were apparent to him even before 1909, when he wrote:

Every revolutionist dreams about a dictatorship, whether it be a "dictatorship of the proletariat," *i.e.*, of its leaders, as Marx said, or a "dictatorship of the revolutionary staff" as the Blanquists maintained. . . . They all dream about a revolution as a possible means of destroying their enemies in a legal manner, with the help of a revolutionary tribunal, a public prosecutor, a guillotine. . . . All of them dream of capturing power, of creating a strong, all-powerful totalitarian state which treats the people as subjects and rules them with thousands or millions of bureaucrats supported by the state. . . . All revolutionists dream of a Committee of Public Safety, the aim of which is to eliminate everyone who dares think differently from those who are at the helm of the government. . . . Thinking, say many revolutionists, is an art and a science which is not devised for common people. . . .

When Kropotkin arrived in Petrograd on June 10, 1917, after 41 years of exile (he had braved German U-boats in the North Sea to reach Stockholm and the train for Russia), he was greeted by a crowd of 60,000 people, who had waited for him in the cold night till 2 A. M. Moved as he was by "that crowd of intelligent, bold, proud faces, celebrating the triumph of light over the shadows, of truth over falsehood, of freedom over slavery," Kropotkin soon began to feel the war-weariness of the Russian people and their subtle demoralization in the face of continued war losses and the concentrated pro-German propaganda of the Bolsheviks. The return to Petrograd, two months earlier, of Lenin (who came through Germany in a sealed train by arrangement with the Kaiser's General Staff) had quickly transformed the Bolsheviks' early collaboration

with the democratic parties into a virulent assault on all of them, on the Provisional Government, and on the Allied war effort.

Kropotkin, even in 1914, had declared that the duty of all freedom-loving peoples was to support the Allies against German militarism, which he considered the most potent center of European reaction and a threat to all peoples. When, in those early days, he was reminded that an Allied victory would also be a triumph for Tsarist Russia, he replied that he was sure that Tsarism would be overthrown and a new régime established in Russia. Asked why he was so sure of a revolution, he would answer: "Simply because everyone in Russia is awaiting one."

The democratic revolution in Russia had made Kropotkin an even more passionate believer in the Allied cause. For with the overthrow of Tsarism and the entry of America under Wilson into the war, the Allies had become, in fact as well as word, the camp of humanitarian democracy in a mortal struggle against reactionary militarism.

Although Kropotkin had declined the post of Minister of Education in the Provisional Government (he saw little reason to alter his principled opposition to governments *per se*), he largely defended its efforts. The Bolsheviks' unsuccessful July *putsch* upset him deeply, as did the resignation of George Lvov, the noble Liberal who was the democratic government's first Premier. At the National State Conference in Moscow in August (attended by representatives of all political parties, social associations, and military organizations, as well as cabinet ministers, army leaders, and former Duma members), Kropotkin looked forward to the coming Constituent Assembly—elections for which were scheduled for late November—and to the type of republic Russia would become: "And, citizens," the great anarchist declared, "the republic must be a federated one, in the sense in which we see it in the United States, where every state has its own legislative bodies, these legislative bodies deciding all the internal problems, while the Republic in all its decisions needs the consent of several states or of all the states."

Kropotkin also delivered an impassioned plea for national unity and for continued resistance to the German aggressor. His voice did not prevail. First the German rout of Kerensky's summer offensive, then the struggle between rightists, centrists, and socialists, climaxed by the Kornilov affair, paved the way for the Bolshevik coup d'état. When, in Moscow that November, Kropotkin

heard the first cannon volleys of the Bolshevik uprising, he exclaimed: "This is the burial of the Russian Revolution."

Although the Bolsheviks treated Kropotkin with deference, he refused to accept any support from them (even turning down royalties from his books re-published by the state) and declined to play any part in the Soviet régime. Soon after Lenin's surrender to the Germans at Brest-Litovsk, Kropotkin described the Bolsheviks to a representative of Woodrow Wilson in this manner:

They have deluded simple souls. The peace they offer will be paid for with Russia's heart. The land they have been given will go untilld. This is a country of children—ignorant, impulsive, without discipline. It has become the prey of teachers who could have led it along the slow, safe way. . . . There was hope during the summer. The war is bad—I am the enemy of war—but this surrender is no way to end it. The Constituent Assembly was to have met. It could have built the framework of enduring government.

By this time, the Bolsheviks had brutally suppressed the Constituent Assembly, elected by universal suffrage with a clear majority for the Socialist Revolutionaries and only 25 percent for the Bolsheviks. The red terror, which preceded and followed the dissolution of the Assembly, had erupted into the horror of the Civil War. All this while, Kropotkin lived in the small town of Dmitrov, not far from Moscow, and kept aloof from the bloody political warfare. Much as he opposed the Bolsheviks, he could not approve of foreign military intervention once it had become clear that the aims of England, France, and Japan in the intervention were so largely territorial.

On May 10, 1919, however, Kropotkin felt compelled to speak to Lenin on a personal matter. An old friend and colleague was being held as a hostage, earmarked for execution, and Kropotkin went to the Kremlin to plead for his life. But the conversation, which took place in the apartment of the old Bolshevik Vladimir Bonch-Bruyevich, soon developed into a long discourse on the revolution and Russia's future.

Kropotkin not only pleaded for his comrade, but tried hard to influence Lenin to abolish the entire system of taking hostages and shooting people in reprisal for opposition activity. He reminded Lenin of the Committee of Public Safety, which had killed so many outstanding leaders of the French Revolution, pointing out how one of its members had later been discovered to have been a former judge under the Bourbons. "I scared him a little," Kropotkin later told his friend Dr. Alexander Atabekian, who first disclosed the

details of the conversation in a speech at Dmitrov a year after Kropotkin's death. To Atabekian, also, Kropotkin confessed his own personal shame at visiting a dictator whose subordinates were busy executing at that very moment the finest representatives of Russian democracy.

Nevertheless, Lenin showed Kropotkin considerable respect at this meeting, the only personal encounter between them after the revolution.¹ The two men talked about Bolshevik methods, about the cooperative movement (dear to Kropotkin's heart), about the development of bureaucratism in the Soviet state. Lenin tried briefly to sketch his own ideal conception of future Soviet development. Kropotkin listened attentively and then told Lenin: "You and I have different points of view. Our aims seem to be the same, but as to a number of questions about means, actions, and organization, I differ with you greatly. Neither I, nor any of my friends, will refuse to help you; but our help will consist only in that we will report to you all the injustices taking place everywhere from which the people are groaning."

Lenin took up this offer and asked Kropotkin to send him information about injustices, which he would take into consideration. On March 4, 1920, Kropotkin wrote such a letter, in which he outlined the chaotic and miserable condition of the countryside under "War Communism," and the sodden attitude of the suffering people toward local initiative:

At every point, people who don't know actual life are making awful mistakes for which we have to pay in hundreds of thousands of human lives and the ruination of whole regions. Without the participation of the local population in construction—the participation of the peasants and workers themselves—it is impossible to build a new life. . . .

Russia has become a Soviet Republic only in name. . . . At present it is ruled not by Soviets but by party committees. . . . If the present situation should continue much longer, the very word "socialism" will turn into a curse, as did the slogan of "equality" for forty years after the rule of the Jacobins.

¹Contrary to this report, based on the account of Atabekian a year after Kropotkin's death, the British writers Woodcock and Avakumovich in their book *The Anarchist Prince*, maintain that there were other meetings. A check of their account of the "other meetings" with Atabekian and other sources indicates that they have divided the conversation of this May, 1919, meeting and the correspondence which followed into new "meetings." Since publication of their book, Kropotkin's daughter Alexandra, now in New York, has personally confirmed to me the fact that there was only one meeting. Alexandra was living near her father at the time.

Nine months later, Kropotkin wrote to Lenin again on the subject of hostages:

Is it possible that you do not know what a hostage really is—a man imprisoned not because of a crime committed but only because it suits his enemies to exert blackmail on his companions? . . . If you admit such methods, one can foresee that one day you will use torture, as was done in the Middle-Ages.

I hope you will not answer me that power is for political men a professional duty, and that any attack against that power must be considered a threat against which one must guard oneself at any price. This opinion is no longer held even by kings; the rulers of countries where monarchy still exists have abandoned long ago the means of defense now introduced into Russia with the seizure of hostages. How can you, Vladimir Ilyich, you who want to be the apostle of new truths and the builder of a new state, give your consent to the use of such repulsive conduct, of such unacceptable methods? . . .

What future lies in store for Communism when one of its most important defenders tramples in this way on every honest feeling?

There were other letters, too, but these were never published. All we know is that they so enraged Lenin that the Soviet dictator told Vladimir Obukh, an old Bolshevik: "I am sick of this old fogey. He doesn't understand a thing about politics and intrudes with his advice, most of which is very stupid."

The well-known Russian publicist, Katherine Kuskova, met Kropotkin often in those days, and she has commented that Kropotkin's "stupid advice" consisted largely of (a) vigorous criticism of the terror, which he said "debases the revolution and will lead to reactionary dictatorship," and (b) appeals to Lenin to find six or seven able non-Bolsheviks who would work with his administration in a determined effort to restore normal conditions of living.

From Kuskova, too, we learn of Kropotkin's grim forebodings—after his meeting with Lenin—of today's global conflict. Kropotkin was convinced that eventually the Communists would gain the upper hand in Europe and would bring the same brutality there as in Russia. Kuskova pointed out that the cultural backwardness of the Russian people had helped the Bolsheviks, but that things were different in Western and Central Europe. Kropotkin replied:

To be sure, little concern was shown for the cultural development of the Russian people. But I am very familiar with the state of Western Europe and I assure you that a Bolshevik revolution there would be a repetition of what we had in Russia. The power of the Communists derives from the fact that they support themselves upon the mob, upon the unorganized, unskilled and ill-paid. Should these elements gain the upper hand in Western Europe, we shall witness a repetition of what has occurred in Russia.

But would not the mob be restrained, Kuskova asked, by other groups, responsible, well-organized and experienced in maintaining justice? "The world," Kropotkin answered slowly, "is in serious perturbation. The world is badly shaken by war, and in the flame of war insanity, human beings have lost all common sense. Anything may happen. And when it does, it will happen according to the Russian style and in no other. The mob everywhere is cruel, corrupt and animated by beastly instincts."

When Kropotkin died on February 7, 1921, the full measure of his prophecy was apparent to only a few. But the thirty-two years that have elapsed—the years of Hitler and Stalin—have made it plain to all. It might well be said that Kropotkin's dashed hopes in 1917, his protest at barbarous Bolshevism, and his grave concern over the emotional balance of a world in flames, represented a microcosm of our world today, when the citizen of a democracy—educated to the hope of a freer world for all men—faces the unabated challenge of Lenin's heirs.

The Kornilov Affair

BY ABRAHAM ASCHER

I

EARLY in September 1917, it appeared as though the Provisional Government would be able to weather the revolutionary storm that was raging throughout Russia. The Leftist insurrection of July 18-20 had been suppressed; the most important Bolshevik leaders were either in prison or in hiding. The agrarian disturbances had subsided somewhat, and a governmental committee was studying means of solving the highly explosive land question. Commanded by an apparently "strong man," the army, it was thought, would at last restore some semblance of discipline in its ranks. American troops were being dispatched in ever-increasing numbers to France, and their presence in the west undoubtedly would have led to a decrease in German pressure on the eastern front. If only the government could have held out a few months longer—until the Constituent Assembly had been convoked—the deepest aspirations of the Revolution might yet have been fulfilled.

The very delicate political stability that did exist, however, was irreparably upset by the Kornilov rebellion of September 9. Though this rebellion completely crumbled within four days, it produced most dire consequences. Fear of counterrevolution, lack of confidence in Kerensky's ability to preserve the gains of the Revolution, even suspicion of Kerensky's complicity with Kornilov—such were the apprehensions that now echoed everywhere. The country was gripped by a new turmoil, of which the Bolsheviks took ample advantage and which immeasurably aided them in their rise to power. The Bolshevik coup, coming right after this abortive revolt from the Right, proved more than the now hopelessly weakened Provisional Government could withstand. The Kornilov Affair was indeed the "prelude to Bolshevism."

The two main protagonists in this affair were Alexander Kerensky, Prime Minister, and General Lavr Kornilov, whom the former had appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief at a time of grave military crisis. After the dismal collapse of the July offensive it was felt that new blood was needed in the higher echelons of the army command. This became especially evident at an important military

conference held at the Stavka in Mogilev on July 29. Kerensky, presiding at this meeting, asked the generals present to report on the condition of the army. Every one of them, and especially General Denikin, vehemently attacked the revolutionary innovations in the army, holding them responsible for the sad state of affairs. General Kornilov, who, because of military exigencies at his front, was unable to attend, sent a telegram expressing his views. While also deploring the lack of discipline within the ranks, he gave it as his opinion that Russia's calamities were the result not merely of this condition but also of the "original and long-standing deficiency of the commanding staff."¹ Furthermore, he spoke sympathetically of the commissars and committees, which, he thought, had a specific and useful function to perform.

In addition to these apparently liberal tendencies, Kornilov also possessed those personal qualities which, it was hoped, would enable him to fashion an effective fighting force out of the languid, dispirited mass the Russian army had become by this time. Whereas General Brusilov, then Supreme Commander, was regarded as irresolute, incapable of decisive action, and lacking any far-reaching influence both over his officers and men, Kornilov was a relatively young and dashing officer who had gained awe-inspiring popularity during the war. Born in 1870 in Turkestan, into a family of Siberian Cossacks, he had to struggle hard to get ahead in the Imperial army. Familiar with fifteen languages, including several oriental ones, he had achieved a considerable measure of success as an explorer of Chinese Turkestan and eastern provinces of Persia. The outbreak of the First World War gave him his opportunity to prove his personal valor. In command of a division, he needlessly, as Brusilov puts it, pushed forward against the enemy and failed to retreat when ordered to do so.² The Austrians captured him and a year later, in 1916, he managed to escape in so dramatic a fashion that the story of it resounded throughout Russia. Within army circles Kornilov gained a legendary reputation.

During the first days of the Revolution, Kornilov was named Commander of the district of Petrograd. At the time of the tumultuous demonstrations against Miliukov's foreign policy, it became evident to the General that the local Soviet had more authority

¹A. F. Kerensky, *The Prelude to Bolshevism: The Kornilov Rising*, New York, 1919, p. 14, hereafter cited as *Prelude*.

²A. A. Brusilov, *A Soldier's Notebook, 1914-1918*, London, 1930, p. 321.

over the mass of soldiery than he himself had. Disheartened and disgusted, he asked to be relieved. The General was then appointed Commander of the Eighth Army, which was one of the few units whose efforts in the July offensive were crowned with a certain degree of success. Boris Savinkov,³ adventurer, revolutionary terrorist, and now right-hand man of Kerensky in military matters, suggested that Kornilov be given command of the whole South-Western front. He recommended this promotion because he considered Kornilov to be the one general "capable of regenerating the combative valor of the army."⁴ Kerensky accepted Savinkov's suggestion, and promoted Kornilov on July 16. Three days later Savinkov and Filonenko, Chief Commissar at the Stavka, military headquarters, drew up a note in Kornilov's name and dispatched it to the Prime Minister. In it was stressed the need for the reintroduction of capital punishment at the front. It is of interest to note that this request represented a sharp modification of the démarche composed by Kornilov's orderly, Zavoiko, who was to play a sinister rôle throughout this affair. The latter had given the note "the character of an ultimatum, with the concealed threat of proclaiming a military dictatorship on the South-Western front if the government refused to comply with Kornilov's demands."⁵ The very fact that Kornilov even considered sending such a note to Kerensky is ample indication of the General's naïveté in matters political. He was, indeed, totally lacking in that quality of diplomatic expression so essential for a man in high position. Patriotic to the core, brave and disinterested in so far as personal wealth and safety were concerned, Kornilov's primary aim was to revitalize Russia's fighting force. In attempting this, he completely failed to take into account the diverse social forces that had to be kept in a state of balance if the very precarious political stability was to be maintained. In fact, one writer has gone so far as to question whether Kornilov actually realized that there were crucial differ-

³Before the Revolution Savinkov had been a member of the Fighting Organization of the Social Revolutionary Party, and had taken part in the assassination of Plehve and of the Grand Duke Serge. He had also participated in the attempts on the lives of Tsar Nicholas II, Admiral Dobjasov, and several others. He described these experiences in his *Memoirs of a Terrorist* and in two novels, *The Pale Horse* and *The Tale of What Was Not*.

⁴B. Savinkov, "L'Affaire Korniloff," in *Mercure de France*, 1919, volume 132, p. 387.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 138.

ences between the Bolsheviks and the other more moderate Socialist parties which controlled the Soviets.⁶

This, then, was the man appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief after the Mogilev Conference of July 29. From the very beginning a series of incidents took place that tended to sow discord between Kerensky and Kornilov. The general agreed to accept the new post only under the following conditions: 1) responsibility to his own conscience and to the people at large; 2) absolute freedom in the issuance of field orders and in the appointment of higher commanders; 3) application of the measures which had been adopted at the front, presumably the reintroduction of the death penalty, in all places in the rear where the army reinforcements were stationed; 4) acceptance of the proposals which he had sent by telegraph to the Conference of the Stavka on July 29. Even so close an associate of Kornilov's as General Denikin was "surprised" at the first condition, and considered it a "highly original form of suzerainty on the part of the Supreme Command."⁷ While Kerensky apparently approved of the "substance" of Kornilov's demands, he vigorously objected to the "ultimative manner" in which they were presented. But the other members of the government did not take this ultimatum too seriously, for they believed that the naïve Commander had been unduly influenced by unscrupulous advisers.

A further incident delayed Kornilov's assumption of his new command. Simultaneous with the appointment of Kornilov, and without his knowledge, Kerensky had designated General Cheremisov Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western front. Kornilov considered this a violation of his rights and threatened to resign unless Cheremisov was dismissed. The Prime Minister was ready to accept his resignation, but Savinkov intervened. A compromise was agreed upon. Cheremisov was dismissed, and Kornilov accepted Filonenko's interpretation of his first condition: "responsibility to the people at large" was to mean responsibility to its authorized organ, the Provisional Government. Finally, Kornilov moved to the Stavka and took over as Supreme Commander.

Though new squabbles constantly arose between these two national leaders, it must be kept in mind that on one essential point they were absolutely in accord. Both wanted to reestablish discipline in the army and order in the country, and at first they con-

⁶W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, New York, 1935, volume 1, p. 197.

⁷A. J. Denikin, *The Russian Turmoil*, London, n.d., p. 303.

sidered each other necessary for the attainment of this goal. Kerensky had the political experience and backing; Kornilov the military. One complemented the other. This is not to say that Kerensky had in mind a personal dictatorship. Nor is there any basis for the Bolshevik assertion that "he had come to a preliminary agreement" with the general "regarding his (Kornilov's) counterrevolutionary action."⁸ Kerensky was a thoroughgoing democrat who cannot be said to have entertained any counterrevolutionary schemes. He merely wanted to bolster the power of Provisional Government by gaining the adherence of a "strong" military man. With the meteoric rise of Kornilov's popularity and the constant rumors of possible coups, Kerensky began to see in his Commander-in-Chief a dangerous rival. And Kornilov developed a hearty dislike for the Prime Minister, for he regarded him as an eternal talker who accomplished little. It was in this tense atmosphere that the "affair" unfolded for five weeks.

General Kornilov's two official visits to Petrograd tended to heighten this tension. On August 16 the General was to deliver a secret report on the military situation before the Provisional Government. As Kornilov started, Savinkov handed Kerensky a note advising against a discussion of detailed military matters, as one minister, who was a leading member of the Soviet, could not be trusted not to divulge important secrets. Kerensky read the note and then passed it on to Kornilov, who immediately cut short his prepared report. Deeply disturbed, the Commander later asked Savinkov whether he was referring to the Minister of Agriculture, the Social Revolutionary, Chernov. In his testimony before the committee investigating this affair, Kornilov made much of this point, namely, that he found it impossible to have much faith in a government one of whose members was suspected of treason.

It was also at this time that Kerensky in a private interview mildly rebuked Kornilov for the imperious and ultimative tone of his dispatches to the government. He then asked the General a rather curious question: did he think it desirable that Kerensky remain at the head of the government? Without hesitation, the blunt soldier expressed the view that while the military set-backs had caused Kerensky to lose some of his popularity and influence

⁸A Commission of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U., ed., *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Short Course*, Moscow, 1950, p. 247, hereafter cited as *Short Course*.

he could not envision anyone else in his place, since he was the acknowledged leader of the democratic parties.⁹

Exactly a week later the Generalissimo again visited Petrograd, this time causing another incident. As has already been pointed out, the primary problem upon which the attention of Kornilov, Savinkov, Filonenko, and even of Kerensky was riveted concerned the reestablishment of an effective fighting force. With this purpose in mind, Filonenko drew up a report advocating three specific measures: reintroduction of capital punishment in the rear for crimes of a military nature, militarization of railroads and war plants, limitation upon the rights of the military organizations. This program, it was hoped, would be presented to the Moscow State Conference for approval. Savinkov submitted these recommendations to Kerensky for his signature. The Prime Minister hesitated to endorse such harsh measures. Indeed, in the light of the existing political situation it was most difficult for him to do so. It would most probably have meant the alienation of groups whose support he desperately needed. Deeply disappointed, Savinkov tendered his resignation (which was not accepted), declaring it as his opinion that "if the Minister of War (Kerensky) did not want to sign the report, the Generalissimo (Kornilov) would do so."¹⁰

The next day, August 23, Kornilov arrived in Petrograd to plead for support for the report Filonenko had drawn up in his name. Since rumors had been circulating at the Stavka that Kerensky intended to dismiss the Commander-in-Chief in Petrograd and to arrest him if he refused to give up his post, Kornilov travelled in the accompaniment of a squadron of the "Tekintzy" Regiment who were armed with machine guns. Once in the capital, he went straight to the Winter Palace, and while he was conversing with the Prime Minister, he had his squadron mount guard at the doors of the palace "ready to come to his help in case of necessity."¹¹ Kerensky, claiming complete ignorance of Kornilov's arrival, was angered at Savinkov for having invited the General. He informed Kornilov that he would have to give further consideration to proposals of such a far-reaching nature. Thus, the government came to the

⁹See J. W. Bienstock, "La Revolution russe: Kornilov," in *Mercur de France*, 1918, volume 125, pp. 20-21.

¹⁰Savinkov, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

¹¹A. Lukomsky, *Memoirs of the Russian Revolution*, London, 1922, translated by Mrs. Vitali, p. 97.

Moscow State Conference, which was convened on August 25, without any definite program.

The Supreme Commander seems to have had in mind some stroke against the government even before his departure for Petrograd. On August 19 he ordered General Lukomsky, his Chief-of-Staff, to concentrate the Third Cavalry Corps in the area of Nevel-New Sokolniki-Veliki Luki. Lukomsky was astonished at this order, for there was no danger of a German advance in that vicinity. Suspecting that the Commander-in-Chief was keeping something from him, Lukomsky asked him the reason for this deployment of a whole cavalry corps. Kornilov replied:

You are right. There are certain considerations which I have not yet spoken to you about. I beg you at once to give the necessary orders for moving the cavalry, and urgently to call the Commander of the Third Cavalry Corps, General Krymov, to the Stavka. I will tell you everything in detail on my return from Petrograd.¹²

On August 24, after his return from the capital, Kornilov told Lukomsky "with indignation" that his journey had been fruitless, and then informed him of the reason for the disposition of the Third Cavalry Corps in the above-mentioned area. A Bolshevik uprising was expected on September 10-11, and he was certain that the "molluscs who form the Provisional Government will be swept away." And furthermore

It is time to put an end to all this. . . . You were right. My chief object in moving the Cavalry Corps is to have it at hand in the vicinity of Petrograd at the end of August and, if this manifestation of the Bolsheviks takes place, to deal with the traitors of Russia as they deserve to be dealt with.¹³

Kornilov gave assurance that he had no intention of opposing the government; he merely wanted to crush the Soviets. In fact, he hoped to reach some agreement with Kerensky in this matter, but if this proved impossible, he intended to deal with the Soviets by himself. Then, he thought, it might be possible to form a truly strong government, one free from traitors. He emphatically disavowed any personal interest: "I only wish to save Russia, and will gladly submit to a strong Provisional Government, purified of all undesirable elements."¹⁴ Lukomsky expressed agreement and offered his wholehearted support.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 96.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 99.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 101.

In the meantime preparations were being completed for the convocation of a Moscow State Conference, the purpose of which was to find a new source of mass support. It was also to be a means of "feeling the pulse" of the nation. Here organized groups from all walks of life were to have the opportunity to express their views on the vital issues of the day. The 2,414 delegates who attended the sessions were almost equally divided between the Right and the Left. Instead of serving as a rallying point for national unity, as it was meant to, this Conference tended to bring into even sharper relief the seemingly irreconcilable cleavage that separated Russian society. When Kerensky appeared on the podium the Left rose and cheered heartily; the Right side of the hall remained seated and silent. Upon Kornilov's entrance the Right accorded him a thunderous ovation, while the Left uttered not a sound.

That certain groups regarded Kornilov as their potential savior became evident at this very Conference. On August 26 he was jubilantly greeted as he entered Moscow. Flowers littered the station. Crowds of citizens, soldiers, and officers lined the streets to catch a glimpse of the hero. A guard of honor composed of officers from the Alexander Military School stood smartly at attention. Various other officers' organizations sent deputations of greeting. Stirring music was played by a military band as Kornilov made his first appearance surrounded by a guard of his picturesquely-attired Caucasian soldiers. While officers carried Kornilov out to the people on their shoulders, a portrait and a biography of the hero were generously scattered from automobiles. The most provocative greeting was uttered by Rodichev, the Cadet¹⁵ who ended his short address with the words: "Save Russia, and a grateful people will reward you!"¹⁶

On the evening of his arrival at Moscow, Kornilov was visited by Minister of Commerce, Iurenev, who urged the General to confine himself in his speech to the Conference to strategic matters and to a general discussion of the condition of the army. He was asked not to reveal the existence of any difference of opinion between the High Command and the government. The Supreme Commander politely rejected this advice on the ground that it was his duty to tell the nation the truth.

¹⁵"Cadet" was the name applied to members of the Constitutional Democratic Party, which represented bourgeois liberalism in Russia.

¹⁶Quoted in L. Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, New York, 1932, translated by Max Eastman, volume 11, p. 150.

The Conference opened amidst a more or less successful one-day general strike called by the Bolsheviks, who boycotted all the meetings on the ground that this was a counterrevolutionary gathering. Kerensky delivered a vague and fiery speech in which he threatened to put down "with blood and iron" all attempts against the government. Obviously directing his remarks at Kornilov and the Bolsheviks, the Prime Minister assured his audience that he would know how to deal with ultimatums, no matter whence they came. The General's address dealt with more concrete issues. After painting the condition of the army and the situation at the front in the blackest colors, Kornilov called for the creation of an army based on "iron discipline." The prestige of the officers was to be reasserted. Furthermore, he flatly declared that all improvements at the front were futile without an amelioration of conditions in the rear. And he saw no difference between these two areas with regard to the severity of the measures that ought to be applied. The government simply had to take steps, no matter how severe, to assure a constant and adequate supply of goods for the army. What this would mean in concrete terms was clear to all. The Right applauded enthusiastically.

Unexpectedly the State Conference ended with a conciliatory gesture. Tsereteli, chief spokesman of the Left wing, and Bublikov, leading representative of industrial Russia, shook hands on the stage of the Bolshoy Theatre. This was to symbolize the unity of the nation, "the armistice between capital and labor in the name of the struggle for Russia."¹⁷ In reality, however, as the British Ambassador to Russia pointed out, this Conference accentuated the difference existing between the various parties. A new governmental crisis was generally expected within a few weeks.¹⁸ Rumors about possible coups d'état were rampant.

Kerensky himself became increasingly suspicious. Upon his return to Petrograd he declared to Savinkov that at the Moscow State Conference "the Counterrevolution had raised its head."¹⁹ While he had known at the end of July that a military plot was in preparation, it was not clear to him who was leading this conspiracy. In fact, in Kerensky's view, it was not until the convocation of the State Conference that the diverse groups of conspirators of the

¹⁷A. F. Kerensky, *The Catastrophe*, London, 1927, p. 284.

¹⁸G. Buchanan, *My Mission to Russia and other Diplomatic Memories*, London, 1923, volume 11, pp. 167-8.

¹⁹Savinkov, *op. cit.*, p. 397.

Right found a leader around whom they all could rally—General Kornilov. It is today extremely difficult to determine with complete accuracy exactly which organizations and men lent active support to Kornilov. Lukomsky's rôle has already been mentioned. It is also fairly well established that the League of Officers of the Army and Navy was plotting both at Petrograd and at the Stavka. Strong suspicion has been thrown upon the Council of the Cossack Troops League, which at the time of Moscow Conference had asserted that "General Kornilov cannot be removed." If this were done, ran the pronouncement, the Council would not be responsible for the behavior of the Cossack troops. The Union of Knights of Saint George and the Military League passed similar resolutions.

As further proof of the existence of a plot, Kerensky cites a very interesting letter General Alekseev wrote to Miliukov on September 25, 1917, after the Kornilov affair had ended. Alekseev pointed out the plight of the families of the officers imprisoned for participating in the affair. They were destitute and in need of financial aid. Unfortunately, continues the letter, he did not know the addresses of M.V. and M.P. (according to Kerensky two well-known bankers) and of several others who were in a position to help. "They cannot abandon the families with whom they had been linked by a community of views and of preparation and permit them to suffer hunger." If they refused to help, Alekseev threatened that General Kornilov would divulge in great detail all the preparations and negotiations that had been carried on prior to the rebellion. He would withhold no names.²⁰ Some members of the upper bourgeoisie, then, seem to have been actively interested in this whole affair.

Chernov, in his history of the Revolution, stresses the part the landowners played in the revolt. A certain Professor Yakovlev, attached to the Kornilov entourage, devised a project according to which the land was to be granted not to the peasantry but rather to the frontline soldiers who remained faithful to their duty. He also favored numerous exemptions from "nationalization" of the land designed to benefit the landowners. The first measure would not necessarily prove that Kornilov was very much concerned with the land question, for he may have approved of such a step merely as a preventive against desertion. Kerensky, too, asserts that the landowners played a major rôle in the Kornilov movement. In his view

²⁰A. F. Kerensky, "L'Affaire Korniloff: Réponse Nécessaire," in *Mercure de France*, 1919, volume 133, p. 206. The letter is reproduced in its entirety in Vera Vladimirova, *Revolutsiya 1917 goda*, Leningrad, 1924, pp. 377-380.

the land reforms which the Provisional Government had put into effect led to a consolidation of the Right preparatory to the attack on the government.²¹ It is probably safe to conclude that the land-owning class looked with favor upon the Kornilov movement in the hope that he would put an end to the peasant seizures of land and restore order in the countryside.

II

While our knowledge of the preparations of this plot is rather hazy, we do know that by the beginning of September military plans had been worked out. On September 2 an officer arrived at Berdichev with a personal message from Kornilov for General Denikin:

According to reliable information, a rising of the Bolsheviks will take place at the end of August. By this time the Third Cavalry Corps, commanded by Krymov, would reach Petrograd, would crush the rising, and simultaneously put an end to the Soviets.²²

Petrograd was then to be proclaimed in a state of war and a new Kornilov Program (content unknown) would be published. Denikin was asked to send a score or more of reliable officers to the capital, where they would be held in readiness for the rebellion. On September 3 Quartermaster-General Romanovsky ordered the distribution of hand grenades to three cavalry units which were to surround and occupy Petrograd from the south. These troops were to be ready to strike by September 9, the day on which the Bolsheviks were expected by Kornilov to stage their insurrection. After a series of explosions in munitions factories in Petrograd and Kazan, Kerensky had just decided that firmer measures in the rear were necessary. This, plus the fact that September 9 marked the six-month anniversary of the first revolution, was expected to arouse the extremists to rebellion. And Kornilov was ready to use this rising as a pretext to strike against the Provisional Government.

At a crucial moment, the Commander-in-Chief received what must have appeared to him as an extremely curious, though highly welcome, order. On September 5 Savinkov arrived at the Stavka with a special request from Kerensky. Kornilov was at this time thoroughly disgusted with the Prime Minister's indecision and failure to put into effect any far-reaching measures in the rear. The

²¹Kerensky made this assertion during a recent private conversation.

²²Denikin, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-17.

general's mood changed considerably when Savinkov informed him of the latest developments. Kerensky had decided to reestablish capital punishment in the rear. Furthermore, Savinkov in Kerensky's name asked the Commander to comply with the following requests: 1) Send the Union of Officers, a certain number of whom were suspected of participating in a conspiracy, to Moscow, where, in Kerensky's opinion, they would be out of harm's way. 2) Liquidate the political department attached to the Stavka, for the same reason. 3) Send a cavalry corps to Petrograd, to be placed at the government's disposal. Savinkov specifically asked Kornilov not to send the "Savage Division"²³ and not to appoint General Krymov Commander of the Corps. Both the General and the Division were regarded as reactionary and bloodthirsty. Kornilov, naturally very delighted, agreed to all these conditions.

It is not difficult to see that Kerensky played right into Kornilov's hands. Ever since, he has been attempting to explain why he asked a general, whom he already suspected of complicity in a plot, for military aid in internal matters. Perhaps, as Kerensky states in another connection, this was due to the fact that he could not quite believe that the High Command was really involved in a conspiracy.²⁴ At any rate, Kerensky felt that the government needed certain additional troops in Petrograd. Due to the breakthrough of the Germans in the Riga area, the government planned to move to Moscow, and soldiers were required to guarantee a safe transfer. Furthermore, a corps was to be held in readiness against possible excesses from either extreme, Right or Left.

Strange as the events in this whole affair had been up to this point, the most mysterious and curious were yet to take place. On September 4 the former Procurator of the Holy Synod, V. N. Lvov (not to be confused with the former Prime Minister, Prince G. E. Lvov) visited Kerensky at the Winter Palace. Posing as the spokesman of important social groups, Lvov offered free advice to the Minister. He told Kerensky very bluntly that the Provisional Government had lost support both among the Right and among the democratic elements. The only way to maintain the government as an effective ruling body was by changing its composition. Elements even more moderate than the Kadets were to be included. When Kerensky asked Lvov to specify exactly which forces he

²³The "Savage Division" was composed of Caucasian mountain tribesmen known for their fierceness.

²⁴A. F. Kerensky, "Sryv Febralya," in *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, 17 February, 1949.

represented, the latter merely answered that he was backed by a "considerable force" and that he was instructed to find out whether the Prime Minister was willing to reconstitute his government. Kerensky has denied ever giving Lvov any instructions or power to negotiate in his behalf. As Prime Minister he had to listen to numerous schemes which were designed "to save Russia,"²⁵ and therefore attached no importance to Lvov's visit. Lvov, however, claimed that he had been empowered to conduct negotiations. It is perhaps reasonable to suppose that Kerensky did not discourage Lvov from pursuing this matter in the hope that he would thus learn more of what might prove to be a dangerous conspiracy, while Lvov greatly overstepped the bounds of his authority.

Wherever the truth in this matter lies, Lvov proceeded to the Stavka and posed as the fully empowered emissary of Kerensky. It is not too clear exactly what Lvov said to the Generalissimo, but he seems to have intimated that the government was amenable to the idea of a dictatorship. Kerensky, said Lvov, was considering three possibilities: 1) Organization of a new government with himself as dictator. 2) A new government invested with unlimited powers and consisting of three or five members, one of whom would be Kornilov. 3) Kornilov as dictator and Supreme Commander at the head of a new government. Which of these, asked Lvov, did the General prefer? Kornilov, elated at Kerensky's willingness to capitulate peacefully and of his own accord, expressed his approval of the third alternative. The general also asked that Kerensky declare martial law in Petrograd and suggested that both the Prime Minister and Savinkov come to the Stavka, as their safety could not be guaranteed in the capital. The composition of the new government was freely discussed at Headquarters, and it was generally assumed that Kerensky would become Minister of Justice and Savinkov Minister of War. A talk with Kornilov's orderly, Zavoiko, convinced Lvov that plans had been laid to assassinate Kerensky.

Lvov hurried to the capital and had a second interview with the Prime Minister in the evening of September 8. Kerensky asked the emissary to put Kornilov's request, which was in the form of an ultimatum, in writing. The Minister was astonished, and his first thought was to verify Lvov's message. That very same evening, before Lvov arrived, Kerensky called Kornilov on the Hughes

²⁵Kerensky, *The Prelude . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-130.

apparatus (species of teletype) and impersonated Lvov. The conversation ran as follows:

Kerensky: I, Vladimir Nikolaievich (*i.e.* Lvov) ask you: Is it necessary to carry out that definite decision concerning which you requested me to inform Alexander Feodorovich (*i.e.* Kerensky) only quite personally? Without this confirmation personally from you, Alexander Feodorovich hesitates to trust me fully.

Kornilov: I confirm that I begged you to transmit to Alexander Feodorovich my urgent request to come to Moghilev.

Kerensky: I, Alexander Feodorovich, understand your answer as a confirmation of the words communicated to me by Vladimir Nikolaievich. Today it is impossible to do that and leave. I hope to leave tomorrow. Is Savinkov needed?

Kornilov: I urgently beg that Boris Victorovich should come with you. What I said to Vladimir Nikolaievich applies in like measure to Boris Victorovich. I fervently beg you to believe that only my sense of the responsibility of the moment compels me to importune you.

Kerensky: Should we come only in the event of the rising of which rumors are in circulation, or in any case?

Kornilov: In any case.

Kerensky: Au revoir! We shall soon see one another.

Kornilov: Au revoir.²⁶

A few minutes after this conversation Lvov arrived at the War Ministry. He and the Prime Minister proceeded to the latter's office at the Winter Palace, where Kerensky related the content of his recent conversation with the Commander-in-Chief. Lvov again confirmed his previous message, and warned of possible danger befalling Kerensky if he should go to the Stavka. An official of the War Ministry sat in a dark corner of the office and, unnoticed by Lvov, listened to the whole conversation. At the end of it Kerensky summoned the officer on guard in the corridor and had Lvov arrested.

At 4 a.m. on September 9, Kerensky met with the Cabinet, which conferred upon the Prime Minister unlimited powers to deal with this crisis. Kerensky rejected Savinkov's advice to negotiate directly with Kornilov as well as Miliukov's and General Alekseev's offers to go to Headquarters as mediators. Dismissing the possibility of compromise, he sent the following order to the Supreme Commander:

I order you immediately to turn over your office to General Lukomsky, who is to take over temporarily the duties of Commander-in-Chief, until the arrival

²⁶E. H. Wilcox, "Kerensky and Korniloff," in *Fortnightly Review*, 1918, volume 11, p. 508.

of the new Commander-in-Chief. You are instructed immediately to come to Petrograd.

Kerensky's excitement at this time may be deduced from the fact that the above telegram bore no official number and was signed simply "Kerensky" without any title of authority.

Fear gripped Petrograd. In violation of his promise, Kornilov had appointed General Krymov Commander of the "Savage Division," which began to advance on the capital. Petrograd seemed well-nigh defenseless. Strangely enough, however, Kornilov's rebellion was suppressed without a single drop of blood being spilled. The Generalissimo, it would seem, did not reckon with the listlessness of his troops, nor with the effective opposition of the workers. The Soviets, controlled by a non-Bolshevik majority, immediately organized workers for defense against the counterrevolution. "The Soviet did not waste time in words," writes Chernov, "but acted, acted as it had in the best days of the Revolution." It formed a "Committee for Struggle with Counterrevolution," composed of three Bolsheviks, three Mensheviks, three Social Revolutionaries, five representatives of the Vtsik²⁷ and the Executive Committee of Peasants' Deputies, and two representatives each from the trade unions and from the Petrograd Soviet. It might even be said that it was due to the efforts of the Soviets, not of the government, that the rebellion was squashed.

The most effective measures were taken by the Railway Bureau, also organized by the Soviets. It called on the workers to cripple the lines of communication and transportation. Some army detachments were sent in the wrong direction and realized it too late. Station tracks were blocked with coaches and in three places the track was actually torn up, thus causing endless delays. Continuous streams of agitators were sent to the soldiers. They were bombarded with proclamations from the Soviet and from the Provisional Government; Kornilov's counter-declarations rarely reached them. A Moslem delegation organized by the Soviet was received by the "Savage Division." When informed that there was no Bolshevik uprising, many soldiers of this division decided to remain loyal to the government. Many others were persuaded by Soviet agitators to refuse to strike against the Kerensky régime by the simple argument that it had freed the soldiers from Tsarist tyranny. Kornilov's

²⁷The Vtsik was the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee, the highest national Soviet authority between congresses.

whole plot melted away, fizzled out. In the light of these activities on the part of the Soviets, the claim that "the Bolsheviks were the only effective force in the capital that was capable of routing Kornilov," voiced in the *Short Course in the History of the Communist Party*,²⁸ loses all credence.

With the revolt obviously crumbling, the Prime Minister called on General Alekseev to help him put an end to this now senseless and harmful mutiny. The latter, anxious to restore order and authority in the country, sent a note to General Krymov, informing him that there was no Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd and asking him to halt the movement of his troops and come to the capital. Krymov entered Petrograd by himself and conversed with Kerensky. The content of the conversation is not known, but after it the General went into the Bureau of the War Office and shot himself. On September 14 Generals Kornilov and Lukomsky, realizing that their rebellion had turned into a fiasco, resigned and, in addition to several others, were arrested by General Alekseev.

III

The Kornilov rebellion was essentially a test of strength between Kornilov and Kerensky; the victor, strange as it may sound, was Lenin. The Bolsheviks did, it is true, aid in the struggle against Kornilov, but certainly not because they supported the Provisional Government. Lenin actually warned his comrades not to commit this mistake. In a letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, written on September 12, Lenin said:

We will fight, we are fighting against Kornilov, even as Kerensky's troops do, but we do not support Kerensky. On the contrary, we expose his weakness. . . . Without in the least relaxing our hostility towards him, without taking back a single word said against him, without renouncing the task of overthrowing Kerensky, we say: we shall not overthrow Kerensky right now; we shall approach the task of struggling against him in a different way, namely, we shall point out to the people (which struggles against Kornilov) the *weakness* and *vacillation* of Kerensky. This has been done before. Now, however, it has become the main thing.²⁹

Indeed, Bolshevik strategy was to help crush the Generalissimo and then take advantage of the ensuing internal chaos. This becomes

²⁸*Short Course*, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

²⁹V. I. Lenin, *Toward the Seizure of Power*, New York, 1932, translated by M. J. Olgin, Book 1, pp. 137-138.

quite clear from an incident Trotsky relates in his *History of the Revolution*. In the midst of the rebellion Kerensky ordered a number of sailors from the cruiser "Aurora" to guard the Winter Palace. Several of their comrades were at that time imprisoned in Kresty for participation in the July insurrection. During their free time the sailors visited the prison, at which Trotsky, Raskolnikov, and others were kept. "Isn't it time to arrest the government?" asked the visitors. "No, not yet," was the answer. "Use Kerensky as a gun-rest to shoot Kornilov. Afterward we will settle with Kerensky."³⁰

Militarily the Bolsheviks also benefited from Kornilov's rebellion. In its anxiety to create a fighting force against Kornilov's advancing troops, the Provisional Government permitted indiscriminate arming of the workers. Thus were formed the first units of the Bolshevik Red Guard, who did not return their arms after the rebellion had been suppressed. Within a few weeks the Red Guard numbered twenty-five thousand. "The army that rose against Kornilov," wrote Trotsky, "was the army-to-be of the October Revolution."³¹ This is somewhat of an exaggeration, but there is no doubt that the nucleus of the Bolshevik armed forces was formed at that time.

Perhaps the most serious consequence of this whole affair was the general demoralization that set in. The rank and file in the army lost what little faith they still had in their officers. Furthermore, the soldiers demanded that instead of generous treatment the generals ought to suffer the same punishment they were so anxious to apply to the disobedient. As Chernov points out:

When it was realized that discipline and capital punishment were for soldiers, not for generals, the front swelled with anger and turned black like the sea before a tempest. The Bolsheviks had only to catch the favoring wind and fill their sails.³²

New desertions, new slaughtering of officers speeded the process of disintegration of the army.

And everywhere Bolsheviks and reactionaries whispered that Kerensky had been in accord with Kornilov on the necessity of a dictatorship and had betrayed him under pressure of the Soviets. Quite naturally, this undermined the confidence of the masses in the Kerensky Government. Furthermore, in the light of the sym-

³⁰Trotsky, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

³¹L. Trotsky, *My Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography*, New York, 1930, p. 318.

³²V. Chernov, *The Great Russian Revolution*, New Haven, 1936, translated by P. E. Moseley, pp. 380-81.

pathy a number of leading liberals (especially Miliukov) had expressed for the Kornilov movement, it became impossible for the parties of the Center to continue cooperating in the government. Mutual confidence had disappeared. When the Bolsheviks, after the attempted knock-out blow from the Right, delivered their blow in November, there was no united opposition with which they had to contend. This was to be the pattern of the destruction of democracy by simultaneous or swiftly succeeding blows from Right and Left throughout the next few decades.

The Bolsheviks reaped the first concrete advantage from the Kornilov Affair on September 13. That day they achieved, for the first time, a majority in the Petrograd Soviet. Five days later the same thing happened in the Moscow Soviet. Fear of counterrevolution had produced a decisive shift to the Left among the working classes; that shift could not but encourage the Bolsheviks in their hopes for a forcible seizure of power. Referring to these electoral victories, Lenin wrote to the Central Committees of the Petrograd and Moscow Committees of the Russian Social Democratic Party on September 25-27:

Having obtained a majority in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals, the Bolsheviks can and must take power into their hands. Assume power at once in Moscow and in Petrograd (it does not matter which begins; perhaps even Moscow may begin); we will win *absolutely and unquestionably*.³³

³³Lenin, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-223.

O. Henry in Russia

BY DEMING BROWN

O. HENRY's books first appeared in Russia in 1923. In the next four years over 750,000 copies of his works were published in the Soviet Union. During the period of the New Economic Policy, only two other Americans—Jack London and Upton Sinclair—exceeded him in popularity. Although his reputation has diminished considerably since then, he remains a minor classic in Russia, and new editions of his stories continue to come out.

The remarks of highly enthusiastic Soviet critics of the twenties indicate four reasons for O. Henry's unique appeal in those years. The first of these was his interest in the effects of urban life on little people.¹ Anticipating the promised era of industrialization, in which Russia would have her own metropolises, Soviet readers sought a future image of themselves in O. Henry's elevator girls and stenographers.² One critic found that the author had captured "the 'soul' of the big city,"³ and another called him the "Rousseau of New York."⁴

A second reason for his initial success was his exposition of American life itself. For decades the Russians had been extremely curious about the United States, but for most of them America remained an exotic land of wonders.⁵ In O. Henry the critics saw a poet of the common man, who would tell them the truth about the "average American." The brisk tempo of his stories, they felt, reflected the pace of American existence.⁶ He provided an antidote for the "spiritual boycott" of America which had been perpetrated by such writers as Gorky and Korolenko. For, as one critic put it, this

¹I. A. Aksenov, "O. Henri. Dusha Tekhasa," *Pechat i revolyutsiya*, No. 5 (1923), p. 304.

²Sergei Bobrov, "Sinkler Louis. Mister Babbit," *Krasnaiya nov'*, No. 5 (1924), p. 322.

³V. Friche, "Tri amerikantsa," *Novyi mir*, No. 5 (1925), p. 123.

⁴Sergei Bobrov, "Novye inostrantsy," *Krasnaiya nov'*, No. 6 (1923), p. 353.

⁵E. P. Bik, "Sovremennyi zapad. Zhurnal literatury, nauki i iskusstva," *Krasnaiya nov'*, No. 6 (1922), p. 351; Sergei Bobrov, "O. Henri. Rasskazy," *Pechat i revolyutsiya*, No. 4 (1923), p. 273.

⁶Boris Anibal, "O. Henri. Novyi Bagdad," *Novyi mir*, No. 6 (1925), p. 157.

writer "does not curse the 'kingdom of the dollar,' he meanders in it like a tadpole in a puddle. . . ."⁷

The third cause of O. Henry's spontaneous acceptance by Soviet readers was the style and structure of his stories. Some critics were particularly impressed by his language, which Chukovsky called "laconic, rich in intonation, original, muscular and fresh."⁸ Even more attractive were his innovations in the form of the short story. In 1925, the prominent formalist critic Boris Eikhenbaum remarked that the Soviet reader "values in him that which is lacking in our own literature—adroitness of construction, a diversity of plot situations and denouements, compactness and swift action."⁹ There were dissenting voices, it is true. Some complained that his stories were "prepared by machine methods" whose "monotony" was "almost tormenting."¹⁰ Likewise, he relied excessively on the surprise ending.¹¹ Nevertheless, the critics repeatedly urged that Soviet writers try to emulate his devices,¹² and there are indications that he did find imitators in the twenties.¹³

The fourth, and probably the most important source of his appeal for Soviet Russians was his ability to divert and amuse. Several critics in the twenties were frank to point out his "escapist" value.¹⁴ As one of them remarked, ". . . it is so pleasant after a boring and unhappy life to drink in strange joys."¹⁵ There was some disagreement, however, concerning the Russian reader's motivation. Eikhenbaum stressed the intellectual charm of the stories, and suggested that Russians read them chiefly for the sheer enjoyment of their

⁷Bobrov, "O. Henri. Rasskazy," *op. cit.*, p. 274.

⁸K. Chukovsky, introduction to "Koroli i kapusta," *Sovremennyi zapad*, No. 1 (1922), p. 17. Similar estimates are in V. Solsky, "O. Henri," *Na literaturnom postu*, No. 7 (1927), pp. 44-46 and B. Eikhenbaum, "O. Henri i teoriya novelly," *Literatura: teoriya, kritika, polemika*, Leningrad, 1927, pp. 166-209. This chapter had been published previously in 1925.

⁹Eikhenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

¹⁰Bobrov, "O. Henri. Rasskazy," *op. cit.*, p. 274.

¹¹V. Veresaeu, "O knizhnoi pyli, o komplimentakh Ruzavelta i o dvukh velikikh russkikh revolyutsiyakh," *Novyi mir*, No. 12 (1927), p. 211; Anibal, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

¹²K. Loks, "O. Henri. Shumi-gorodok nad podzemkoi," *Pechat i revolyutsiya*, No. 1 (1925), p. 291; S. Zh-ko, "O. Henri. Koroli i kapusta," *Oktyabr*, No. 2 (1924), p. 211; Eikhenbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 185; Solsky, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

¹³O. Nemerovskaya, "Roman kino-lenta," *Na literaturnom postu*, No. 2 (1928), p. 26. The critic did not identify any specific imitators.

¹⁴Loks, *op. cit.*, p. 292; Sergei Obruchev, "O. Henri. Volchki," *Pechat i revolyutsiya*, No. 7 (1925), p. 283; Ya. Frid, "O. Henri. Chetyre milliona," *Novyi mir*, No. 7 (1925), p. 156.

¹⁵Obruchev, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

convolutions of plot.¹⁶ Others, however, felt that while the author's narrative tricks were refreshing and entertaining, the basis of his appeal was mainly emotional, since his twists of plot served to convey a lightly ironic or sentimental message.¹⁷ All agreed, however, that O. Henry offered the Soviet reader a release, a temporary escape from his grim worldly cares.

But even in this period of greatest enthusiasm, the critics paid close attention to the social implications of the stories. And from the very first, he was found lacking both in breadth and depth of social understanding. As early as 1923, a critic regretted that O. Henry was "not one iota a contemplator."¹⁸ It was true that his stories frequently touched upon situations of social pathos, that he often concentrated on small tragedies in the lives of ordinary people, and that he showed a partiality for poor and obscure individuals caught in the web of adverse economic circumstances. It was easy to read a note of social protest into his writing, and many critics attempted to do so. But they were almost always disappointed. One critic wrote that while the author obviously perceived much that was "false and hypocritical" in America, "he does not have enough meanness to spit upon it. He speaks either with pain or with forgiveness."¹⁹ Another remarked: "He does not see that the country is split into two warring camps, that around him there is unfolding a very great social drama. If one is to believe his stories, all is well in the bosom of American democracy. There are no class contradictions, no exploitation. Under the shadow of the Star Spangled Banner social tranquillity reigns."²⁰

He was the slave of the bourgeois milieu about which he wrote; he accepted its standards and had no intention of objecting to them.²¹ The critics noted that millionaires fascinated him, and that he saw no particular social danger in them. The proletariat was entirely absent from his stories.

On the other hand, they felt, he was not altogether insensitive to the evils of bourgeois society. At times, almost unwittingly, he was possessed by a feeling of boredom in dealing with the "triviality" of life under capitalism. As an antidote to this boredom, he chose

¹⁶Eikhenbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-201.

¹⁷Obruchev, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-283.

¹⁸Bobrov, "O. Henri. Rasskazy," *op. cit.*, p. 275.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 275.

²⁰Friche, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

²¹Frid, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

humor. But, according to the critic Friche, "this is the humor of a man of an intermediate class, for whom there is no other conclusion but just such a half-bitter smile with which to endure a life without perspective and horizons, a life in which there is neither content nor meaning."²²

Others felt that his humor was the traditional "laughter through tears,"²³ and indeed there were those who called him the "American Chekhov."²⁴ But the majority agreed with the critic who wrote that his art was a "retreat in the face of the terrible problems of life, from which you can hide only in a sentimental story."²⁵ He wrote only to please the dominant bourgeoisie, his sole desire was to entertain, and he had categorically refused to take part in the "struggle for a better life."

Practically everything that has been written about O. Henry in the Soviet Union since 1927 follows this same line. The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* contends that "all of his technique was directed toward external, purely formal and therefore superficial effects," and that he "studiously avoids the contradictions of life. . . ."²⁶ In some respects he was distinctly anti-social: "He has been correctly named . . . the 'great consoler.' Yes, he is a 'consoler,' since he sows illusions, he gives vain hopes, he deceives his readers into believing that everything will be all right, that the beautiful life can be built without the slightest effort or struggle. It is false, this art of O. Henry, it is dangerous like opium, since it diverts one from life and struggle."²⁷

In 1937, however, there were attempts to rehabilitate the author as a social critic of sorts. It was suggested that underneath his apparent sentimentality there was a deep sense of the tragedy of life in bourgeois society. The essential quality of an O. Henry plot was not its fortunate outcome, but the element of surprise. For the optimism of his happy endings was purely sham. Perceiving the shallowness of capitalist culture, he had slyly developed his narrative innovations as a means of protesting against it: "Every story

²²Friche, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

²³Solsky, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

²⁴S. Zh-ko, *op. cit.*, p. 211. This critic objected to the practice.

²⁵Obruchev, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

²⁶S. D., "O. Henri," *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, Moscow, 1929, XV, 215-216. The author of this article is probably Sergei Dinamov, who also wrote on O. Henry for the *Literary Encyclopedia*. See S. Dinamov, "Henri," *Literaturnaya entsiklopediya*, Moscow, 1929, II, 462-464.

²⁷"Peredovaya," *Internatsionalnaya literatura*, No. 5 (1933), p. 3.

of O. Henry is a malicious mockery of trite notions about the ordinary American, a sharp polemic against the authors of bourgeois tales, against the editors of cheap newspapers and magazines, who cultivate banal language and trite plots. With his tricks of plot, O. Henry protested against the arithmetical-mean approach to the ordinary American."²⁸

There were even more ambitious claims. He possessed a "firm belief in man, in the tremendous power of the human will," and his chief goal was the "exposure of bourgeois individualism." In contrast to most of bourgeois literature, his art was a "burning moral sermon," since he was "organically connected with the life of urban and rural poverty, of working people crushed by need and sorrow."²⁹

A reply to claims such as these was not long in coming. The critic Startsev emphasized that O. Henry had been essentially a humorist, denied him any social value, and accused him of purposely distorting the facts of life. He had known the darkest sides of America, but had refused to write about them. As a result, his stories, though fascinating to read, were "sugary and absurd."³⁰

Despite ideological strictures such as these, O. Henry is still published in the Soviet Union. In fact, the Russians probably think better of him than do his compatriots, for he obviously continues to answer some special need in the Soviet reader. Certainly, the factors of style and *genre* are important in this respect. Brevity, racy patter, the surprise ending with its lightly ironical or sentimental twist—O. Henry's stock-in-trade—are not common in Russia's own literary tradition. With the possible exceptions of Chekhov and Zoshchenko, no Russian has his flavor. This suggests that he continues to be popular because of the piquancy of his narrative method.

A more important source of his continuing attractiveness may be ideology itself. The stories of O. Henry, despite their evident sympathy for the underdog, their frequently satirical tone, and their preoccupation with life's disappointments, can all be classified as light entertainment. Soviet literature, on the other hand, does not often display a light touch. The obligation to instruct has been a guiding

²⁸A. Leites, "Skovanny smekh," *Izvestiya*, September 10, 1937.

²⁹N. Ch., "O. Henri (75 let so dnya rozhdeniya)," *Literaturnoye obozreniye*, No. 16 (1937), p. 60.

³⁰A. Startsev, "K voprosu ob O. Henri," *Internatsionalnaya literatura*, No. 2-3 (1938), p. 351.

principle of the Soviet arts since the inception of the Five-Year Plans. Not only does Soviet Marxist literary theory condemn stories which are merely diverting; it also demands a didactic element in harmony with the principles which constitute the basis of Soviet culture. Soviet humor, for example, is expected to be based on social satire much stronger and sharper than that of O. Henry. Likewise, such devices as the fortuitous happy ending and the melancholy coincidence, which the author uses so frequently, are in fundamental conflict with the official Soviet literary doctrine which insists that man must not be portrayed as a pawn of fortune. Finally, the sentimentality of which Soviet critics accuse the author is purported to spring from a false standard of values in which righteous social indignation is displaced by pity.

But it is safe to assume that vast numbers of Russian readers fail to share the ideological prejudices of the critics. Constant strictures against the unreality of O. Henry's happy endings probably fail to impress the Soviet reader, for that reader is himself sentimental and enjoys short flights into a world of whimsy and gentle irony. The comments of the critics have frequently contained a note of caution, an implicit warning to the general reader lest he be seduced by the harmful moral and social values and the message of "consolation" which O. Henry's stories are purported to contain. Now the fact is that this writer *is* sentimental, glib and superficial, albeit clever. No doubt, most students of American literature would agree with the Soviet critic who characterized his stories as "magnificent railroad reading."³¹

Russians, however, probably have as great a potential appetite for "railroad reading" as other people. Significantly, Soviet publishers under the NEP issued this type of literature in great quantities. O. Henry was the most prominent among the Americans represented, but there were dozens of others. In 1928 the importation of this kind of writing ceased. While American popular magazines still print thousands of stories whose style and quality is comparable to that of O. Henry, Soviet publishers have continued to shun them. The sole exception is O. Henry himself. A huge stream of light fiction, the truly "mass" literature of twentieth-century America, is represented in the Soviet Union by this author alone. One may speculate on the motivation of the Communist Party in continuing to sanction his publication. But it is clear that, despite years of constant indoctrination, Russian readers still like to seek release in a good yarn.

³¹Veresaeu, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

Russia and Turkey, 1677-1681: The Treaty of Bakhchisarai

BY C. BICKFORD O'BRIEN

THE mid-seventeenth century marked a "watershed" in Russian foreign policy. Except for trade, Russia's relations with foreign powers during the first half of the century were intermittent and were limited mainly to immediate neighbors. But in the second half of the century, with larger-scale warfare going on in many parts of Europe, and with Russia making notable territorial gains in Europe and Asia, Moscow's foreign relations gradually acquired prominence and permanence. Nowhere was Russia's changing position in the political calculations of Europe better illustrated than in the readily discernible tensions of its relations with Turkey.

For Russia the period was one of powerful social upheavals within the state, of vast territorial expansions, and the development of closer political and cultural ties with Western Europe. As the national boundaries were expanded, new and conflicting responsibilities drew Russia into the vortex of West European politics and enlarged its status as a European power.

Russia had modest trade relations with Turkey before the mid-seventeenth century, and in 1569 and in 1637-1642 engaged in two wars against the Turks, but these had resulted in no regular ties between the two states.¹ This was in line with Turkish policy which had maintained no exchanges of permanent diplomatic representation with European powers until the early seventeenth century. The Russian tsars, in common with other princes of the day, had infrequent contacts with Constantinople before the reign of Tsar Feodor Alekseevich (1676-1682). Most of the problems affecting Moscow and Turkey were dealt with through the mediation of Turkey's Black Sea vassal, the Crimean Khan. Only upon necessity were couriers and temporary envoys exchanged. Sometimes such envoys would proffer congratulations upon the accession of a new tsar or sultan; on other occasions they submitted complaints re-

¹N. A. Smirnov, "Rossiya i Turtsiya v XVI-XVII vv.," *Uchenye zapiski*, Moscow, 1946, XCIV, Part II, p. 4.

garding the treatment of merchants, or objected to raids against the peaceful inhabitants of border regions.²

The southward expansion of Russia along the Volga, its struggle with Poland for control of the Ukraine, and its steady approach toward Azov and the Black Sea changed all this. In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a genuine Russo-Turkish problem came into being.³ Moscow's gradual replacement of Poland as the principal overlord of the Ukraine challenged Ottoman control of the Black Sea and the existence of the Crimean khanate. The Tatar khanate there, and their kinsmen living along the Azov coast and the Kuban, were the last European remnants of the former Mongol empire. Tatar raids on the Ukraine had prevented Russia's peaceful agricultural colonization of the southern steppe, and had kept the Ukrainian borders of Poland and Russia officially undefined and vulnerable to attack. Only by a periodic show of strength and by regular payment of tribute to the Tatars did Russia avert more serious inroads into its territories. Russia's advance toward the lower Dnieper between 1654-1667 caused the Tatars to renew their attacks on the Ukraine with greater force. Moscow almost inevitably had to remove them, as a last obstacle to its advance to the shores of the Black Sea.

It was this issue in the seventies and eighties of the seventeenth century which widened the breach between Russia and Turkey. The Ottoman rulers were struggling to recover and expand their territorial position in the Balkans, and along the northern littoral of the Black Sea. Under the vigorous leadership of the Kiuprili family of grand vizirs, an ambitious offensive had begun against the Hapsburgs in Hungary, against the Venetian strongholds in the Levant, and against what remained of the Polish Ukraine.

Any conquest of the Ukraine posed difficulties. Geographically the area was a steppe, a wide grassland. Sudden spring thaws often caused floods, which greatly impeded travel. In the summer, the region was often plagued by prairie fires and drought. Except for the Zaporozh'e, the settlements along the central Dnieper had few natural defenses, and were located some distance from the principal military bases of their potential overloads—Poland, Russia, and Turkey.

The Cossacks of the Right and Left Bank Ukraine offered a

²F. Lashkov, *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii krymskago khanstva s Moskovskim gosudarstvom v XVI i XVII vv.*, Simferopol, 1891, p. vi; Smirnov, *loc. cit.*, p. 4.

³A. N. Shebunin, *Rossiia na Blizhnem Vostoke*, Leningrad, 1926, p. 3.

measure of effective defense, but they, too, created a problem. Cossack loyalties were divided. Some of their atamans wished to establish themselves as a territorial aristocracy, in place of the Polish nobility. In this hope they were resisted by the peasant masses, who bitterly opposed the creation of a new class of landlords. On occasion the fears and restiveness of the peasants spread beyond the Ukraine into the Don and Volga river valleys, where they combined with such formidable movements as the uprising of Stenka Razin, which swept the lower Don and Volga in the sixties and seventies. The rivalries and divergent aims of the Cossack hetmans also produced complications. In their effort to remain free of external control they often bargained and vacillated with friends and enemies alike. In the end they committed themselves politically only for a price or upon threat of being overturned.

Russia's concern for the Ukraine in the seventeenth century was linked with a glimmering sense of the opportunities in another direction. During the first half of the century Turkish administration in the Balkans was becoming increasingly decadent and oppressive. The Christian population there suffered many abuses. Not until the accession of the Kiuprili vizirs (1656) was there strong indication that their position might be improved through large scale reforms. A feeling simultaneously developed in the minds of certain Balkan Christians that Russia would some day intervene to alleviate their sufferings. As if to justify such speculation the cultural relationship between Russians and Balkan Christians came to be emphasized by precursors of Pan-Slavism and protagonists of eastern Orthodoxy. Moscow may have found the idea alluring; it was also impractical. The tsars had important issues to resolve closer at hand and did little before 1675 to encourage the Balkan Christians to hope that Russian aid in their behalf was imminent. It was true that the representatives of eastern Orthodoxy were received with courtesy at the Muscovite court and that reports of the oppressions of the Balkan Christians were listened to with patience and sympathy, but little encouragement was given before the eighties that Russia would take any positive steps to relieve their burdens.⁴

It was Moscow's gradual incorporation of the Ukraine more than any previous event that raised the hopes of the Balkan Christians.

⁴*Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii 1649 goda*, St. Petersburg, 1830. "Charter to the Moldavian voevoda and ruler Sherban Kantakuzin giving him hope that he shall be received with all his lands into Russian subjection" (December 28, 1688).

If the Ukrainian Cossacks—the vanguard fighters of Orthodoxy—could successfully obtain aid from Moscow in their struggle against the infidel Tatars, might not the Moldavians, Wallachians, and other Christian subjects of Turkey hope for similar support against the infidel Turk? Such arguments for aid from Russia by Balkan Slavs and the Greek Orthodox clergy became more articulate in the second half of the seventeenth century. When they were reinforced by parallel encouragement from West European powers, they were not without effect on Moscow.⁵ Among the notable examples of such sentiment during the period was the Croatian émigré, Iurii Krizhanich. Krizhanich urged Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich to annihilate the Crimean Khanate, remove the Russian capital to Perekpó, and launch a struggle against the Turk for the liberation of all Christian Slavs. “It would be advantageous to this land,” he once wrote, “to expand its boundaries to the south, not to the north nor to the east nor to the west. . . . The Crimea . . . and the Nogai lands are full of God’s gifts of all varieties. . . . Wars with Poland and Lithuania have been unprofitable. Therefore, . . . it is advisable to keep peace with all northern, eastern, and western people and fight against the Tatars. . . .”⁶

Certain orthodox Greeks appeared to exert great influence on the Tsar. Paul, an Archdeacon of Aleppo who journeyed to Moscow during Tsar Alexis’ reign to collect alms for the Turkish Christians, reported an interesting conversation between the Tsar and certain Greek merchants there in 1657. During an Easter church service, the Tsar, having heard a report of the woes of the Balkan Christians, asked the Greek merchants if they wished him to free the Greeks from Turkish captivity. They replied: “How could it be otherwise?” The Tsar then declared, “Well then, having returned to your country, ask all the monks and bishops to pray God . . . for me, so that their prayers might give me strength to cut off the head of the enemy.” And turning to his Russian noblemen he added: “. . . I have decided, if God is willing, that I will employ all my army, shedding my own blood to the last drop, but I shall try to free them.”⁷

⁵S. Zhigarev, *Russkaya politika v vostochnom voprose*, Moscow, 1896, pp. 89-90.

⁶Iurii Krizhanich, *Russkoe gosudarstvo v polovine XVII veka*, Moscow, 1859, pp. 117-118.

⁷Zhigarev, *op. cit.*, p. 91; Reports of Turkish atrocities in the Balkans continued to reach the tsars during the following years. See for example *Polnoe sobranie Zakonov*, II, pp. 946-949.

Thus, the incorporation of the Ukraine was significant not only because it marked the further advance of Russia toward the Black Sea, but also because of the hopes it may have aroused among Turkey's Christian subjects. When incipient Pan-Slavism and religion combined with the military interests of Austria and Poland to involve Moscow in an anti-Turkish coalition, the political alignments of all powers affected by the Turkish question and by Russo-Turkish relations underwent important changes. It is with one phase of this problem of political realignment—namely, Russo-Turkish relations—that this article is chiefly concerned.

During the reign of Tsar Feodor Alekseevich, Russia began a new war against Turkey. The conflict was an outgrowth of a Turkish struggle with Poland, begun in 1672. At the outbreak of the war two hetmans governed the Ukraine: from his capital at Baturin, Hetman Ivan Samoilovich ruled the Left Bank, or eastern Ukraine, which had recently fallen under Russian domination; from his capital at Chygyryn, Hetman Peter Doroshenko ruled the Right Bank, the western Ukraine still under Polish suzerainty. Doroshenko, who refused to recognize this condominium, became a formidable obstacle to the development of a joint Russo-Polish policy toward the Ukraine. Rather than submit, he attempted to place himself and the entire Zaporozh'e under the protection of the Turk.⁸

This circumstance had evoked a war between Poland and Turkey, which went badly for the Poles. Alarmed at the reports of large Turkish armies moving northward, Warsaw solicited aid from Moscow, and in March 1672 the Tsar agreed to furnish an auxiliary army which would help quell Doroshenko's rebellion. Before launching the war with Turkey, Tsar Feodor informed the Sultan of his agreement with Poland. He urged Turkey and its vassal, the Crimean Khan, to give Doroshenko no aid, lest the Tsar be forced to enter a larger anti-Turkish coalition—one which would include many Christian princes, as well as the Don Cossacks and the Shah of Persia.⁹

Moscow's warning went unheeded. In August 1672, a powerful Turkish army launched the first of five summer campaigns which gradually forced the Poles to sue for peace. During the campaign of 1676 the Russian Prince G. G. Romodanovsky and the Hetman of the Russian Ukraine, Ivan Samoilovich, besieged Doroshenko at

⁸M. Grushevsky, *Ocherk istorii ukrainskogo naroda*, St. Petersburg, 1904, pp. 268-272.

⁹Zhigarev, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

his capital at Chigirin. Doroshenko surrendered, and was then permitted to become a vassal of Moscow. Contrary to an agreement with Russia, the Poles concluded a separate peace with the Turks at Zorawno, in a treaty which was more favorable to Poland than an earlier truce agreed upon at Buczacz (October, 1672). Only part of the Polish Ukraine was ceded to the Turk. With the conclusion of the treaty and the defection of Doroshenko to Moscow, the Turks now supported Iurii Khmel'nitsky, the son of Bohdan Khmel'nitsky, as hetman of the Right Bank Ukraine. The town of Chigirin, still in Russian hands, was besieged by a formidable Turkish army. The ensuing defense of the stronghold was ultimately relieved, but in 1678 a second Turkish force, led by the newly appointed Grand Vizir Kara Mustafa, finally took Chigirin.¹⁰

Turkish jubilation was short-lived. Within six months, the whole Ukraine rebelled against Hetman Khmel'nitsky, who, when he attempted to escape from his Cossack subjects, was overtaken near the Dniester river and executed. Throughout the summer of 1679, fierce fighting ravaged the Ukraine. Scores of villages were devastated and the towns of Cherkassy and Kanev were obliterated. In an effort to end the warfare, young Tsar Feodor Alekseevich repeatedly sought military aid from Warsaw and Vienna, but he obtained only vague promises of future assistance. Meanwhile, in 1679, the Turks—eager for more satisfying prizes than Ukrainian fortresses and concerned lest Moscow succeed in forming a large scale anti-Turkish coalition—offered the Tsar an advantageous peace. Moscow accepted.¹¹

At the end of 1679, the Russian envoys, Sukhotin and Mikhailov, were ordered to the Crimea to guide the peace negotiations. They were replaced in 1680 by a more experienced diplomat, V. M. Tiapkin, aided by N. M. Zotov and a Ukrainian scribe named Rakovich.¹² The negotiators met the Crimean khan's representatives, who also served as agents of the Turkish sultan at Bakhchisarai, a picturesque little town in the foothills north-west of Yalta. Negotiations took place in the Khan's palace.

Originally the Russian envoys had been cordially received and honored with a splendid reception. But later, when they presented their terms and showed obstinacy regarding counter-proposals of the

¹⁰Grushevsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-277.

¹¹Grushevsky, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

¹²"Bakhchisaraiskii mirnyi dogovor 1681," *Diplomaticheskii slovar*, Moscow, 1948, I, p. 218.

Crimeans, tension developed. They were suddenly thrust into prison. Weeks later, after they had shown great patience and refused to be intimidated, they were released. Not until January 13, 1681 (N.S.), was the Russo-Turkish agreement, known as the Treaty of Bakhchisarai, concluded. The treaty primarily concerned Russia and the Crimea. At Adrianople later in the year, and again in the spring of 1682 at Constantinople, the Bakhchisarai agreement was confirmed by the Turks, even though it concerned them only indirectly, and new terms were added. This agreement may, therefore, be said to consist of two parts: the treaty concluded at Bakhchisarai which dealt with Russian-Crimean issues; and its ratification at Adrianople and Constantinople, which confirmed the Russo-Tatar agreement and added stipulations of direct concern to Russia and Turkey.

The first agreement at Bakhchisarai dealt with the Dnieper boundary, the demilitarization of the lower Dnieper river area, the payment of tribute, guarantees to Russia against further Tatar-Turkish attacks, and the right of Russian subjects to trade in the Crimea. In the formal enumeration of titles the Russian sovereign came off second-best; evidently the agreement was drafted by the Khan's envoys, who concentrated on titles appropriate to the importance of the Khan. Flamboyant adjectives—"audacious," "exalted," "benevolent"—were used to describe Khan Murat Girei's power, fame, and personal attributes. Very little was said about Tsar Feodor.¹³

The main provisions of the treaty were as follows: (1) an armistice between Russia and the Crimea was concluded for twenty years with the river Dnieper as the boundary; (2) the territory between the Dnieper and the river Bug to the southwest was to remain a buffer zone, a no-man's-land, between the Russian Ukraine and the Crimea; (3) as in the past, Russia would pay tribute to the Khan; (4) any attacks on Russian subjects by those of the Khan or the Turk would be severely punished; (5) Kiev and the towns pertaining to it—Vasilkov, Tripol'e, Staika, and others—were recognized as belonging to the Russians; (6) Russian traders could move freely in the Crimea, where they were promised equitable treatment and immunity from illegal seizures of their goods.¹⁴

A copy of the treaty was brought to Adrianople for preliminary

¹³*Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii*, St. Petersburg 1830, II, pp. 290-292.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

ratification by the Turks. Prompt approval was given, with an understanding that final ratification would take place in Constantinople. At Adrianople the control of the Right Bank Ukraine by Turkey and the Left Bank by Russia was reaffirmed. Again it was emphasized that no towns or villages were to be built along either bank of the Dnieper between Kiev and the Zaporozh'e. The pre-eminent position of Turkey in the Black Sea was carefully stated. The Sultan was described as the "sovereign of sovereigns" and the ruler of the eastern and western cities of the Black Sea.¹⁵

The Russian envoys subsequently journeyed to Constantinople to obtain final ratification of the treaty, and to discuss other matters that directly affected Russo-Turkish relations. Various diplomatic hurdles delayed the completion of the peace until the following April, 1682. After these and other obstacles were overcome, Turkey finally adhered to the treaty. The terms of ratification, like those of the original agreement, were written under the direction of the Moslem plenipotentiaries. The titles and powers of the Crimean Khan and of his overlord, the Turkish Sultan, were elaborately reiterated. The general tone of the agreement was one of condescension to Moscow. The Bakhchisarai stipulations were repeated; others were added. It was provided that shifts in the population of the recently contested Dnieper area might take place. Russian or Turkish subjects who resided along the banks of the Dnieper, and who wished "of their own free will" to remove themselves from one side to the other and to exchange their allegiance, might do so without hindrance. Arrangements for the exchange of war prisoners were made.¹⁶

Particularly interesting was the stipulation which dealt with the travel of Russian orthodox Christians within Turkey.¹⁷ Russian subjects—monks "and any other people" who wanted to journey to the Holy Land to worship—were to be permitted to do so without molestation. Aid was to be given them, and it was expressly stated that no one would harm them in any way. In its relation to the question regarding the holy places of Palestine, which was to arise in the mid-nineteenth century, this provision has unusual significance. It provided Russia with a new avenue of influence in Turkey.

The Treaty of Bakhchisarai, then, along with other events in the late seventeenth century, marked a turning point in Russo-Turkish

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 389.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 389-392.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 391.

relations. Turkey's decision to support Doroshenko and to enlarge the Polish struggle into a war against Russia had backfired. The Ukrainian campaign, a political, if not a military, blunder marked an ill-conceived effort on Turkey's part to establish control over the whole Ukraine—a move as inimical to the Poles and Russians as it was to the majority of the Ukrainians. Only through a full-scale military effort could the attempt have succeeded. Grand Vizir Kara Mustafa appeared unwilling to support an occupation. Although he captured Chigirin and lesser strongholds along the Dnieper and in the Zaporozh'e, he won only Pyrrhic victories. In the end, the Sultan had to settle for less than he had bargained for. Kara Mustafa's withdrawal from the Ukrainian campaign in 1680 suggested a close parallel to his more spectacular withdrawal from before Vienna in 1683.

At Bakhchisarai, Turkey acknowledged for the first time the incorporation of the Left Bank of the Ukraine and of Kiev by Russia. The right of Russian subjects to trade along the Dnieper as far as the Black Sea and to visit the holy places within the Ottoman Empire was confirmed by the Sultan. The treaty thus established important precedents which Russia was to expand in subsequent agreements with the Turk.

The advantages won at Bakhchisarai encouraged Moscow to pursue further gains; the subsequent conquest of the Crimea became a basic design of Russian foreign policy. Up to this time, the khanate had proved incapable of checking the attacks of its subjects on Russian territories and had persisted in its demands for tribute. If Russia's southern flank were to be made secure, the khanate must eventually be destroyed. So long as it remained, Turkey held a strategic base for attacks along a vulnerable frontier, and Russia's access to the Black Sea was forestalled. Thus, the agreement of 1681 offered only a stop-gap solution. What Prince G. Romodanovsky must have dimly foreseen in 1677, his successors—Prince V. V. Golitsyn in 1687 and Marshal B. C. von Münnich in 1737—clearly understood. But not until Catharine II's reign did another Russian commander, Fieldmarshal G. A. Potemkin, accomplish the larger purpose—conquest of the Crimea.

The Treaty of Bakhchisarai altered Moscow's rôle in Europe. Having inherited Poland's Ukrainian problem as well as those involving the Crimea and Turkey, Russia now represented a further bulwark against the advance of Turkey in Europe. Turkey was an aggressor nation, intent on extending its influence into Western

Europe and gathering into its orbit satellites such as Hungary and the Ukraine. It was upsetting the European balance of power. The fear that other parts of Europe might succumb to an alien culture at times submerged the traditional rivalries of the European powers, uniting them in the common purpose of defeating the Turk and driving him out of Europe. Inevitably, once the hour of danger had passed, old quarrels were revived.

In 1681 the pattern of Turkish aggression was taking shape. Having shown his strength in the Ukraine without substantial gain, the Turk came to terms with his northern opponent, and turned to richer prizes in the west. Moscow, having failed to obtain satisfactory guarantees from Poland and Austria, came to terms with the common enemy, the aggressor Turk.

At Bakhchisarai Moscow demonstrated an ability to make an advantageous peace with Turkey, alone. In the future, if the Polish king and the Holy Roman Emperor wanted Russia's support in an all-out war against Turkey, they could hope for it only at the price of further concessions to Moscow. And such concessions must come largely from Poland. Turkish recognition of charges affecting Poland had already been conceded at Bakhchisarai. More ground work was thus laid for the settlement of outstanding differences between Warsaw and Moscow, and for the acknowledgment by Poland of the final cession of Kiev and other Ukrainian towns to Russia.

The agreement of 1681 foreshadowed some interesting relations between Russia and Austria. Vienna momentarily became generous, and showed solicitude for Russian interests in the Balkans. In 1684, Emperor Leopold sent an embassy to Moscow. Pleading for a new alliance against the Turk, the Austrian ambassador reminded Moscow of the political opportunities to be exploited. He urged the tsars to join in the struggle to force the Turk out of Europe, and to seize the present occasion to possess new lands along the Black Sea and in Asia.¹⁸ Once the danger had passed, however, such suggestions were quickly withdrawn. Austria had its own policy in the Balkans.

In the long series of historical events which eventually led to Moscow's acquisition of territories on the Black Sea, and its involvement in the Near Eastern Question, the Bakhchisarai Treaty thus holds a notable place.

¹⁸Address of Baron von Blumberg to the Tsars [1684] as reproduced in K. A. Viskovatov, "Prizyv rossii na bor'by s Turtsiei," *Russkaya Starina*, St. Petersburg, 1878, XXII(2) p. 447.

The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

BY GEORGE C. GUINS

The Soviet scholars have not only to catch up with but to surpass scientific achievements of other countries. Stalin's speech, February 9, 1946.

SCIENTIFIC work in the Soviet Union is not less subject to the government's control than any other branch of cultural activity. There are several academies in the Soviet Union: Artillery, Architecture, Communal Economy, Medicine, Art; two academies of R. S. F. S. R. of Agriculture and of Pedagogy; and one of Social Sciences (*obshchestvennykh nauk*) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, for preparation of theoreticians and propagandists of Communism. The most significant, however, in the field of science is the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. As a government institution the Academy of Sciences is working in conformity with the general line of the Communist Party and the program of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. It assists the government in both its war and its peace policy.

During World War II the Academy's contributions became very essential. The detection of planes and the protection of boats from magnetic mines, improvements of fuel and lubrication for winter-time, perfection of artillery, construction of missiles, etc.—all that had been done by the Soviet scientists.¹

So far as the current post-war program of the Academy is concerned, it was characterized by A. N. Nesmeianov, in his first speech as President of the Academy, February 16, 1951, as follows:

. . . generalization of the experience in socialist construction and gradual transition to Communism and, correspondingly, discussion and solution of problems of a paramount significance in the field of economics, philosophy, law, philology, ethics, esthetics, connected with the transition to Communism . . . assisting in the foundation of a proper basis for Communism, huge

¹See A. F. Joffe's report in the *Collected Volume of Reports Presented During the Formal Session of the Academy of Sciences in November 1942 on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the October Revolution*, Moscow, 1943. See also S. I. Vavilov, *Tridtsat let sovetskoi nauki*, 1947, pp. 52-53, also his *Nauka Stalinskoi epokhi*, 2nd ed., 1950, pp. 62-65, and *Bolshaiya Sovetskaya Entsyclopediya*, 2nd ed., 1949, v. I.

new constructions and new sources of energy, further development of agricultural economy, improvement of mechanical equipment, discovery of new kinds of material and everything that can relieve the worker and obliterate the contrast between mental and physical work. . . .²

For the fulfillment of such a great task the Soviet Academy has been transformed into a huge scientific organization with numerous branches, and an army of workers amounting, according to the late President of the Academy, S. I. Vavilov, to about a hundred thousand people.

Before the Revolution, the Academy of Sciences in Russia did not differ essentially from similar institutions in other countries. It consisted of eminent scholars and had been devoted to pure science without special practical tasks. Universities, not the Academy, had been the real centers of scientific activity, while the Academy, as the bearer of the highest scientific authority, promoted scientific discoveries and distributed awards. Individual members of the Academy pursued their own research work in accordance with their own plans. Various administrative institutions as well as the Geographic Society, the Free-Economic Society, and other social organizations of similar character, as well as private companies, organized their own explorations, research work, and experiments for their special goals and needs. Everything was based on private initiative.

The Bolshevik Revolution abolished both social and private organizations, and the Academy of Sciences was radically reorganized. In April, 1918, Lenin wrote his "Outline of Scientific-Technical Projects," in which he formulated as an urgent task of the Academy: "a systematic solution of the problems of even distribution of industries throughout the country and the most rational utilization of the country's economic resources."³

One after another, different scientific institutes were established in Leningrad and Moscow, and the Soviet government began to spend vast sums for the development of scientific research.⁴ In 1934 the Academy of Sciences was transferred to Moscow from Leningrad and was placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Council of People's Commissars. Different institutes for scientific research, which had been organized earlier by the Soviet government, were incorporated into the Academy. In 1936, the research institutes of

²*Pravda*, February 17, 1951.

³Vavilov, *Tridtsat let Sovetskoi nauki*, p. 27.

⁴J. G. Crowther, *Science in Soviet Russia*, London, 1930. See also *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsyclopediya*, 1947, Part XII, "Nauka."

the Communist Academy were also added to the Academy of Sciences. It became thus the leading scientific institution in all spheres of knowledge. Universities and other institutions of higher learning, the so-called *vuzy*, became intermediate links between the Academy and practical life. They prepare the cadres of scientific and practical workers and work out both theoretical and technical problems. The everyday elaboration of all kinds of problems of practical significance rests on the special branches and factory laboratories. The work of all scientific institutions is planned and subject to the guidance of the Academy of Sciences, but at the same time the various scientific institutes have their own functions and responsibilities.

The leading rôle of the Academy and the character of its organization can be illustrated by the organization of conferences in the Academy with the participation of representatives of different institutes and factories. In 1940, as S. I. Vavilov states, there were 70 conferences and consultations of this kind. Sometimes the Academy organizes outside sessions in those provinces whose problems have to be discussed.⁵

For closer contact with the country, the Academy organized its affiliated branches, almost all of which have been transformed gradually into the Academies of the Union Soviet Republics. There are at present twelve such Academies. Two of them in the Tadzhik and Turkmen Republics were organized in 1951 in connection with projected large-scale constructions of canals for better exploitation of water resources. Earlier, Academies were organized in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and in the three Baltic Republics.

Besides the Academies of the Constituent Republics and their affiliated branches, there are numerous institutions and laboratories under the direct supervision of the Academy of the U.S.S.R. Among them there are different research institutes, botanical gardens, observatories, reservations, experimental stations, museums, etc.

In 1929 and later, since the Academy was instructed to concentrate on the problems connected with the development of socialist economy and culture, its ranks were immediately augmented by new academicians and the so-called corresponding members. In 1946 alone, the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. added to its roster forty-three new members and one hundred and twelve cor-

⁵Vavilov, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-45.

responding members. The 1946 addition to the Academy rolls is more than the total membership of full academicians and corresponding members in pre-revolutionary Russia.

According to Article 11 of the Statute of the Academy of Sciences, "Scholars who, through their works of paramount significance, assist the socialist up-building of the U.S.S.R., may be selected as academicians." Consequently, in accordance with the practical and political tasks to be carried out by the Academy, new academicians and other members are mostly elected from among the eminent technicians, outstanding practical workers, and Party members. The Soviet press represents them in the following manner: "The leading scientist elected to the Academy comes not only from academic and other similar institutions, but also from specialized research institutions of the non-ferrous metals, iron and steel, electro-technical and other branches of industry as well as transport and agriculture. This affords excellent opportunities for bringing the Academy into still closer contact with the national economy."⁶

Assisting socialist construction requires not only special scientific training and experience but also organizational capacities. Therefore, those who have earned recognition as organizers of scientific work in the U.S.S.R. are also elected to membership in the Academy.⁷ Thus Party members naturally have an opportunity to be elected to the Academy in recognition of and as a reward for their "organizational" efforts. Consequently, the most prominent leaders of the Party are either rank-and-file members of the Academy or its honorary members.⁸

The need for scientific personnel is evidently pressing. All the Academies are occupied with the preparation of the cadres of workers of different ranks. There are three scientific degrees in the Soviet Union: candidates of science, docents, and doctors. On November 4, 1947, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. adopted a resolution "concerning the training of highly qualified cadres in the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R." According to this resolution, the training of scientific cadres is to be organized by assigning young scientists working in higher educational institutions, scientific research in-

⁶*Moscow News*, December 11, 1946.

⁷A. Mikhailov, "The Organization of Scientific Work in the U.S.S.R.," *The American Review on the Soviet Union*, March, 1947.

⁸About Stalin's "great scientific genius," see S. I. Vavilov, *Nauka Stalinskoi epokhi*, 2nd ed., 1950, pp. 10, 26, and 128.

stitutes, and enterprises, to be candidates for the doctorate in the Academy of Sciences. During their training, but for not more than two years, candidates receive the same salary which they have on the staffs of their institutions and enterprises. Some of those assigned for training are, however, not separated from their basic employment.⁹

No wonder that Vavilov numbers the army of the Soviet scholars at more than a "hundred thousand."¹⁰ It consists, in fact, of tens of thousands of engineers, technicians, and even *kolkhoz* workers affiliated with the various scientific institutions.

After a session of the Academy, in November, 1946, the following instruction for the post-war activity of the Academy was suggested in *Izvestiya*: "The Academy must concentrate its activity on the fulfillment of the practical task of building up a new life in our country, and of promoting technical progress in all branches of the national economy of the U.S.S.R."¹²

"The practical task" really dominates all investigations and researches of the Academies and their scientists.¹³ The Belorussian Academy is occupied with the problem of extensive use of peat, as one of the greatest constituents of Belorussian national wealth. The Academy of the Uzbek S.S.R. directs its efforts to studying the nature of soil, water supply, and climatic conditions in connection with the choice of one or another crop in various regions of the Republic. The task of the Latvian Academy at the time of its organization was closely connected with building up an advanced agriculture and a highly productive livestock farming, and forestry. In Azerbaijan, the Academy is preoccupied with the utilization of oil resources: "Many important problems in oil geology have to be solved to promote oil production. It is necessary to work out new methods of refining, to extend the utilization of by-products and to study the question of power supply."

The Academy of the Kazakh Republic "shall help people set up

⁹N. K. Karatayev, "The Training of Young Soviet Scientists," *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, No. 1, 1948.

¹⁰Vavilov, *Nauka Stalinskoi epokhi*, p. 23.

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

¹²Quoted from the *Moscow News*, November 30, 1946.

¹³See "Affiliates and Bases of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.," by the Academician N. V. Tsitsin, in *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, No. 10, 1947 (*Soviet Press Translations*, March 15, 1948).

a powerful iron and steel industry."¹⁴ In its program for 1951, the research work was connected with the project of the Stalingrad hydro-electric center as well as with the main Turkmenian canal.¹⁵ Correspondingly, the affiliates and local branches of the Academy of the U.S.S.R. are also engaged in a different task of purely practical significance usually connected with the Five Year Plans. The Far Eastern Base is conducting research on coal-tar phenols. The Archangel station is studying methods for the use of a number of products of wood-pulp chemistry in order to obtain new and more valuable products from them. All the affiliates and bases are dealing with botanical problems. Vegetable raw material is being discovered and studied for the preservation of vitamins, medical compounds, and means of combatting insects—the pests of agricultural crops and the parasites of agricultural animals; the grass cover of pastures is being studied for the purpose of raising their feed productivity.

Further examples are scarcely needed to characterize the practical trend of the activity of the Soviet Academies. If we add that one tenth of all Academy publications are books devoted to popularization of sciences and textbooks for students, it will further emphasize how extensive and sometimes simplified is the work of the Soviet Academies.

Dr. Joffe, an outstanding scholar and academician, stated in the *Moscow News* of June 16, 1945, that Soviet science is planned "without any detriment to the treatment of deeply theoretical problems." This is scarcely so, at least as far as the past is concerned. For example, it is universally admitted that there are exceptional minds among Soviet mathematicians: I. M. Vinogradov, C. N. Bernstein, P. L. Chebyshev. This is what was said in the Soviet Union about their work: "The development of the subjects of mathematical science is progressing unequally and, what is even worse, according to no plan. The best minds are concentrating on its purely abstract aspects: the theory of complex numbers, the theory of series, topology and algebra."¹⁶

Much more highly praised and rewarded than the pure mathe-

¹⁴See a full report on the achievements of Soviet science in the *Iubileinyi Sbornik posvyashchennyi tridsatiletiyu Velikoi Oktiabrskoi Revoliutsii*, Akademiia Nauk S.S.S.R., Moscow, 1947, V. I-II.

¹⁵*Izvestiya*, August 25, 1951.

¹⁶Joffe, *op. cit.*, p. 171. In 1946 the Academy had already its own Five Year Plan (about 1500 pages). See Vavilov, *Sovetskaiya nauka na novom etape*, 1946, p. 73.

maticians are such "scientists" as A. C. Lorch, who succeeded in perfecting potatoes; M. A. Lisovenko, whose achievement is an improvement of the Altay apple-tree; not to mention A. P. Zhdanov, who discovered a new method of splitting atoms with the aid of cosmic rays; Vanykov, the inventor of a new smelting method, etc.

"Personal tastes" are not encouraged in a scientific worker. This is clearly expressed by the academician N. V. Tsitsin and by the former president of the Academy, S. I. Vavilov:

We have not yet completely eliminated that sort of planning of scientific research which allows the personal "tastes" of a scientific worker in the choice of subject matter to prevail over the interests and requirements of national economy and cultural development of a given republic, territory, or region. (Tsitsin)

We have, however, to confess that on a par with the indisputable and essential achievements of our scientific institutions in assisting Five Year Plans, it can still be observed that they try sometimes to keep apart from practical needs and obvious trends and to be absorbed into that "pure science" whose "purity" is practically determined by how great is the absence of any connection with the problems of life.¹⁷

Practical tendencies prevail certainly in Soviet science because of the pressure from above and the dependence upon the government. The Chief Secretary of the Presidium of the Academy of the U.S.S.R., the academician A. V. Topchiev, emphasized in the report which he presented to the annual meeting of the Academy on February 2, 1951, that the preceding year, 1950, had been characterized by further strengthening of the ties between science and practice. "Scholars of different specialties," he said, "assist in fulfilling the grandiose Soviet plan of the reorganization of nature."¹⁸

However, in spite of all efforts, it is impossible to overcome some individual interests and predilection for theoretical research free from burning actuality. At least the Soviet press continues to uncover deviations from the right course: "Lagging behind in working out the most important problems of the socialist construction, lack of desire to choose useful subjects, lack of a practical trend in work are serious faults of some scientific workers who pretend to get scientific degrees."¹⁹

¹⁷Vavilov, *Nauka Stalinskoi epokhi*, pp. 74-75.

¹⁸*Pravda*, February 3, 1951. To the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. is attached a Committee involved in the work of reorganization of the irrigation system, building up new hydro-electric power stations and the main Turkmenian canal (Vavilov, *Nauka* . . ., p. 107).

¹⁹*Izvestiya*, July 11, 1951.

A significant psychological problem, similar to the problem of individualistic tendencies among the farmers, is hidden in the above-quoted lines. Ineradicable individualism and predilection for independent work and free initiative oppose constantly and stubbornly regulations and constraint. There is, however, an additional reason for the tendency to evade practical problems. Vavilov mentioned in his survey that some local institutes "fence themselves off from the factories."²⁰ This phenomenon can hardly be explained otherwise than by the fear of responsibility. A laboratory, in which a scholar can make experiments of a purely theoretical and neutral character, is a sanctuary where he can feel himself free and safe.

The Soviet leaders consider as a great advantage of the Soviet organization of scientific work that it is founded on principles of centralization and planning:

In the capitalist world science is disunited, diffused. Scientific endeavor is bound hand and foot by cutthroat competition and rivalry which impel scientists to conceal their findings and inventions. In the Soviet Union science has been made a cornerstone of the entire edifice of society. . . . Scientists and scientific institutions in all fields make it a rule to join forces for insuring the most efficient solution of the problems at hand.²¹

Centralization and planning of scientific work involves all central and peripheral organizations. Academies of the Union Republics are in fact affiliates of the Academy of the U.S.S.R. Both sides, according to the Soviet press, stand to gain from close and coordinated work. "For discussion and coordination of research in separate branches of science, the Academy sets up commissions, committees or councils. . . . The council has to coordinate the work of . . . institutes to prevent overlapping or to avoid gaps, and to direct activities in such a way that, with the personnel and equipment available, the best results may be obtained."²²

Another officially acknowledged advantage of the present organization of the Academy is a fruitful collaboration between pure science and practical engineering. At least the Soviet press highly appreciates the results of this collaboration. Thanks to the researches of the Russian chemists the following industries have come into existence in Russia: synthetic rubber (Lebedev, Favor-sky), plastics (Ushanov), fertilizer (Britske, Volfkovich), pharmacology, sulphates, also the procurement of magnesium, rare

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 82.

²¹*Moscow News*, December 11, 1946.

²²A. Mikhailov, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

elements (Khlopin), a chemical theory of polishing and burnishing glass (academician N. A. Prianishnikov's achievement), and a complete emancipation of the Russian optical industry from that of Germany as a result of the successful study of the physico-chemical property of glass, especially of its surface layer—all these achievements are ascribed to both organization and practical sense.

The Soviet government, to be sure, cannot produce geniuses, but when it comes to the question of assisting the scientists in their work, if it is acknowledged as proper for Soviet needs, it is evident that such assistance is given generously.²³ The funds necessary for the experiments and payrolls of technical personnel and co-workers are furnished when needed. Having but limited possibilities, the Soviet government concentrates its efforts on definite tasks and does not worry about expense when a need is urgent. The few specialists at its disposal are duly and generously provided for, so long as they are needed. Team-work is encouraged; there are prizes in the offing.

On the other hand, there are many negative features which complicate and handicap the scientific activity of Soviet scholars. The Communist Party is responsible for coordination of scientific activity with the general policy of the Soviet government and its political goals. There are special Party organizations inside the various Academy institutions, and, according to *Pravda*, a leading rôle in the reorganization of scientific research work of the Academy is taken by those party organizations. The "scholar Communists" must head the development of the scientific work, and the education of the new cadres of scientific workers in Marxism-Leninism, and they are responsible for the coordination of all work and research.²⁴

Constant interference with scientific work on the part of Party members, their attitude of defiance toward "pure science" and their predilection for practical and technical knowledge are not favorable to the flourishing of theoretical science.²⁵ Last but not least, Soviet

²³"The Soviet achievement of nuclear fission evidences the strides that have been made. It was accomplished sooner because of the treachery of Klaus Fuchs and others like him, but there can be little doubt that it would have come without them. A country with scientists and mathematicians of the stature of Frenkel, Kolmogorov, and Kapitsa, to name but a few, has the intellectual personnel required to solve the problem. . . ." Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, N. Y., 1950, p. 533.

²⁴*Pravda*, October 23, 1946.

²⁵Moscow University was reprimanded once by the Minister of Higher Learning, Kaftanov, for the inadmissible choice of topics of scientific research: namely its interest in spiders and indifference to the vital problems of agriculture and industry.

political philosophy and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism with all its zigzags, hang over scientists. In connection with the famous Genetics debate and Lysenko's theoretical views, the Academy's presidium published in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* a letter addressed to Premier Stalin, in which Stalin was promised that the Academy would "correct mistakes" in Biology and develop Soviet science "in the name of the victory of Communism." Later a similar letter was published also by the Academy of Medical Sciences.²⁶

Philosophy, History, Economics, and Law suffer especially in Soviet Russia from the political and ideological pressure and are practically paralyzed.²⁷ In 1951, even linguistics underwent instructive directives from Stalin's infallible authority.

Is there anything in the Soviet organization of academic work which could be of interest and, may be, of use for another country? Undoubtedly an organized research has its advantages if it is based on the principles of coordination and not subordination. The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. is transformed into a huge bureaucratic apparatus. There are so many scientific institutions and so large a staff of co-workers that there is neither sufficient connection nor the necessary exchange of scientific information between the special branches and departments of the Academy.²⁸

²⁶*Pravda*, September 25, 1948. Cf., about the Lysenko problem, Professor Karl Sax, "Soviet Science and Political Philosophy," *Scientific Monthly*, July, 1947, and Pamela N. Wrinch, "Science and Politics in the U.S.S.R.: The Genetics Debate," *World Politics*, July, 1951, pp. 486-519.

²⁷Even Communists like Alexandrov in the field of Philosophy, Pokrovsky in History, Eugene Varga in Economics, did not escape criticism and disgrace. Cf. "Soviet Culture" by G. C. Guins, *The Russian Review*, Autumn, 1947.

²⁸"Departmental isolation is, unfortunately, still considerable in our country. It exists . . . even inside a single academy. . . ." S. I. Vavilov, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

Book Reviews

KOLARZ, WALTER. *Russia and Her Colonies*. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. 335 pp. \$6.00.

This volume is an excellent general survey of the policies of the Kremlin toward the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union and is all the more effective as an indictment because it is carefully documented, for the most part, and is based exclusively on Soviet sources.

Mr. Kolarz explodes the myth of Soviet federalism with consummate skill and analyzes the overriding centralism which has ruthlessly subordinated local national interests to those of the Russian-dominated center. He regards Stalin as one who has continued the centralism of Ivan the Terrible and Peter I and points out, correctly, that Communists like Christian Rakovsky and Mykola Skrypnyk desired a confederation of Soviet republics in 1922 and thus incurred Stalin's enmity in defending the interests of Ukraine.

A very concise general statement regarding the nature of Soviet nationality policy is followed by an examination of the treatment which has been accorded each nation within the Soviet Union. The reader will find here the tragic story of the liquidated national republics whose existence was "guaranteed" by the Stalin constitution. Mr. Kolarz is of the opinion that the liquidation of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, the deportation of the Balkars, and the abolition of the Karachay Autonomous Province show that Stalinism has been as ruthless in the Caucasus as was tsarism when it originally conquered the fiery mountaineers

after prolonged and fierce resistance which was followed by armed uprisings.

Mr. Kolarz has provided adequate documentation of the new Russian state chauvinism which is now rampant and which Stalin ceased condemning in the early 1930's. Throughout the volume there are references to the systematic rewriting of the history of each non-Russian people which has made the Russians everyone's "elder brother." Shamil, the national hero of the Moslem peoples of the Caucasus who defended their homeland against Russian imperialism, has been denounced as a servant of British and Turkish imperialism. Professor Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian historian, is condemned anew more than two decades after his death—a fact which probably serves as an admission of Soviet failure to wipe out non-Russian nationalism. The Kremlin has even found it necessary to combat national deviations among tribes living within the Arctic Circle.

Mr. Kolarz has placed considerable emphasis upon the ways in which Communist Russian imperialism has endeavored to utilize national movements as in the case of the Armenians and Kurds and in the establishment of the Moldavian A.S.S.R. as a prelude to the seizure of Bessarabia. He also indicates that the Soviet Union has made a claim to being a Scandinavian country as a result of the creation of the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R., the development of the Murmansk region, and the 1944 annexation of the Petsamo (Pechenga) area which established a

120-mile Soviet-Norwegian frontier.

There are a few errors in the volume. For example, Kaganovich was made secretary of the Central Committee of the Party in Ukraine in May 1925 and not in 1926 (p. 131); the West Ukrainian Metropolitan was named Slipy and not Slepoy (p. 141); *okrugi* (on pages 22 and 59) should be *okruga*. In dealing with Carpatho-Ukraine (p. 138), Mr. Kolarz overemphasizes the rôle of the Russophile element which was always small; confusion has arisen from the fact that the natives at one time called themselves *rusini* or *rus'ki*—indicating an attachment not to *Rossiya* but to *Rus'*, the Kievan State.

Mr. Kolarz has chosen to express his views on the future of the peoples of the Soviet Union. He recognizes that "those peoples who for geographical, historical, cultural, and economic reasons will not fit into a new Russian Federal State will leave Russia . . . in the process of tremendous political upheavals which are likely to accompany a change of régime." For those peoples who might elect to remain in some kind of political union with the Russians, Mr. Kolarz desires to see the Soviet mock federation transformed into a genuine federation. However, one might question whether the Ukrainians and the Moslem peoples would be willing to trust the Russians in any kind of federation in view of their experiences since 1922.

The data presented in this volume and the conclusions which they support must be regarded as indispensable to anyone who regards himself as a serious student of the Soviet system or of Russian history. It should contribute greatly

to the growing awareness of the existence of millions of non-Russians in the Soviet Union.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.
Princeton University

DEGRAS, JANE (Ed.). *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. New York, Oxford University Press, Volume I (1951) 501 pp. \$7.00. Volume II (1952) 560 pp. \$9.00.

Of very great interest to scholars of Soviet affairs is a series of several volumes, of which this review covers the first two. Volume I deals with the period 1917-1924 and Volume II, 1925-1932. This series serves two important functions: it brings together a large and representative collection of material hitherto available only in separate books, periodicals, and newspapers, and thus not readily accessible at all; and it provides these materials, many previously obtainable only in Russian, for the use of those who could not use the original sources even if available. This compilation is, thus, one more of a long and distinguished group of scholarly services by the staff of this important British research institute.

The list of documents from which the present selection is made will be found in *Calendar of Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (R.I.I.A., 1948). The volumes here being reviewed do not include Soviet treaties and agreements registered with the League of Nations and published in its *Treaty Series*, or the speeches of Soviet delegates to the preparatory commission of the League dis-

armament conference. Also omitted are most documents relating to or emanating from the Communist Party and the Communist International, the inclusion of which would have widened the coverage unmanageably.

As it is, these volumes include very diverse documents: speeches by Trotsky, Lenin, and Stalin; official statements by the Narkomindel; decrees of the Council of People's Commissars; a small number of treaties; interviews by Chicherin, Trotsky, and Rakovsky; and a number of the appeals broadcast to foreign governments and to workers' groups. Among the documents of the Communist Party are the decrees of the Central Executive Committee on the struggle against imperialism, and on ownership of lands and islands in the Arctic; the report by Stalin to the C. E. C. on the independence of Finland; and a joint decree of the C. E. C. and the Council of People's Commissars breaking relations with China in 1929.

It is noteworthy, in this connection, that it was a party not a government agency which signed the 1927 and 1929 treaties with Turkey and the 1927 agreement with Latvia. The "interrelations" of party and government are further observable when Dovgalevsky writes to the British Foreign Secretary in 1929 (II, 391), "this new circumstance . . . requires a fresh examination of the question. For that reason the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs finds itself compelled to ask for fresh instructions from the Presidium of the C. E. C. of the Union, which will consider the new proposals of the British Government at its next plenary session."

No Western government would be likely to make a similar admission.

Most of the documents are quoted from such sources as *Correspondence diplomatique se rapportant aux relations entre la Republique Russe et les Puissances de l'Entente*, *Desiat' let Sovetskoi diplomatii*, the League of Nations *Official Journal*, *Sovetsko-Amerikanskie otnoshenia*, *Stenograficheskie otchet s'ezda Sovetov*, *Pravda*, and *Izvestiya*.

A reading of these documents reveals—emphasizes—what is generally known about the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. There is the usual propagandistic flavor, the normal name-calling and finger-pointing, the vitriolic denunciations, the unlimited verbosity and repetition which characterize Soviet-Communist discussion of any topic. It takes fourteen pages for *extracts* of Rykov's report to the 5th Soviet Congress and twenty-four for Litvinov's 1929 report to the C. E. C. Those were the days, of course, when Stalin's control was not so firmly established as later and it may have been necessary, perhaps, to explain matters in greater detail to the party comrades. It is almost astonishing to read Chicherin's admission (II, 33) that criticism was being directed by party members against his Polish policy. He called them, indeed, nothing more severe than "a couple of eccentrics." Gentleness was not characteristic, however, and it sounds very normal to hear from the Council of People's Commissars (I, 88), "Workers! Like a vicious dog let off the leash, the entire capitalist press of your countries is howling for the 'intervention' of your Governments in Russian affairs, shrieking, 'now or never!'" Then as now the blame was always put on Soviet opponents. "We had

to sign the Brest-Litovsk treaty," says the Council of People's Commissars in an appeal to the toiling masses of England, America, France, Italy and Japan, "because your Governments . . . refused to participate in international peace negotiations where their strength would have saved Russia and given you an acceptable peace. It was not Russia, bled white as it had been for three and a half years, that betrayed your cause; it was your own Governments that flung Russia under the heel of German imperialism." A novel and typical explanation!

Certain features of Soviet policy during the immediate post-Revolution period are plainly silhouetted against the background when one has all these documents together in a single, chronological presentation. More than a dozen appeals were made between 1917 and 1920 by Chicherin and others in an effort to arouse the "toiling, oppressed and exhausted" peoples of other countries to revolt against their exploiters. More than a dozen foreign office messages were dispatched by means of wireless, an unorthodox method of communication between governments even when one of them has not yet been recognized by those to whom it was appealing.

A dozen other instances, scattered over a decade, show Soviet diplomats assaulted or murdered, and Soviet embassies or consulates occupied by the police. This is not only an excessive use of nondiplomatic techniques in a post-war period, but seems to indicate that Soviet diplomats were not following traditional patterns of diplomatic behavior, or, at least, that the receiving governments suspected their operations. These cases may well have been the forerunners of current

cold-war tactics, the diplomats being the expendables. Suspicions of what the Soviet diplomats were actually doing must surely seem more plausible today than in the 1920's when certain operations of Soviet embassies and trade delegations and the Comintern had not yet been revealed and publicized. In all these cases the Soviet leaders, their innocence all-aggravated, shouted denunciations of their enemies, charging "obvious" plots, patent forgeries, and police terrorism. If the Soviet government has grown from an insecure weakling pleading openly for recognition into one of the two greatest powers (these documents are an amazing portrayal of that power growth), at least there are certain constant factors in the relations between the Soviets and other governments.

In two or three ways these volumes might have been made more widely useable. There are no introductory, connecting, or summary comments by the editor. Advanced scholars will have no need for such assistance, but surely many students of Soviet affairs will be puzzled by the revelations of some of these documents unless they have time to read the whole history for themselves. It would have been helpful, likewise, had there been a statement of the other government's position in certain controversies, or at least an indication of where this position could be found. On the Arcos raid and the Litvinov letter incidents, for example, we have the Soviet but not the British position. Such inclusion would have produced obvious publication problems but one cannot help wondering if the resultant aid to students would not have been worth the cost. It might have been quite possible to eliminate some of

the less important documents, to achieve this. These are relatively minor matters, however, in view of the general merit which these volumes possess and their long-run usefulness to all whose interest in this field was circumscribed by their inability to obtain these materials.

DONALD G. BISHOP

Syracuse University

SHIMKIN, DEMITRI B. *Minerals—A Key to Soviet Power*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953. 452 pp. \$8.00.

For the specialist on Soviet economics, Soviet geography, and related fields, this volume is a "must" acquisition. Never before has such detailed and comprehensive information on the Soviet Union's mineral wealth been gathered together in one convenient volume. Never before too, in all probability, have such a multitude of Soviet sources on this subject been so carefully and painstakingly exploited and the data they contain brought together to help piece out the jigsaw puzzle which is the problem of Soviet present and future strength.

In the bulk of this book, Dr. Shimkin examines carefully the known sources, utilization patterns, and economic characteristics of each of the mineral resources of the Soviet Union. On the most important, like iron ore, coal, and petroleum, similar information has previously been available, but on many others—cobalt, molybdenum, tungsten, beryllium, niobium, platinum and the like—information accessible in English—or even in the most common Soviet sources—has been slight. If only for this

vast mass of encyclopedic matter, all of us in this field would be Dr. Shimkin's debtors.

More overall in view and somewhat more analytical in tone is the concluding chapter which attempts to sum up the development and potentials of Russia's mining industries. Dr. Shimkin here presents and discusses indices he has calculated of Soviet mineral production and mineral consumption, both expressed as aggregates in terms of 1937 United States dollars. Though there are many problems in both the construction of such indices and their employment in analysis, the beginning made here is useful. On the subject of future adequacy of Soviet mineral supplies, Dr. Shimkin feels generally that this should present no major problem since many promising Soviet areas have still been hardly scratched by the geologist and mineral prospector. There are, of course, serious economic problems involved, however, in the increasing exhaustion of some of the best and most advantageously located mineral resources and the growing need to substitute for them minerals obtained from far out in the Siberian taiga or beyond the Arctic Circle.

HARRY SCHWARTZ

New York City

WETTER, GUSTAV A. *Der Dialektische Materialismus, Seine Geschichte und Sein System in der Sowjetunion*. Vienna, Thomas Morus Presse, 1952. 647 pp.

G. A. Wetter is Professor of Russian History at the Papal Oriental Institute in Rome. In 1945 he delivered a series of lectures on the

philosophy of Marxism at the Institute. The lectures appeared as a book in Italian in 1948. They were published by a well-known Italian publishing house which is known for its Communist sympathies. Now the book has appeared in an enlarged form in German under the imprint of a leading Catholic publishing house in Vienna. The book is written with an unusual degree of objectivity and from a thorough knowledge of all the Russian sources. Its main part (pp. 265-566) is a systematic exposition of the present Soviet philosophy. It does not make easy reading for the non-specialist, and perhaps even many philosophers will find it rather dry. This is certainly not the fault of the author but is inherent in the character of this kind of philosophy. Of much greater interest is the chapter in which the author discusses the history of dialectic philosophy in Russia from 1931 to the present (pp. 203-259). All the various changes down to Stalin's latest essays on Marxism and linguistics are lucidly analyzed. Perhaps the extent to which Stalin's latest essays have put an end to the whole Marxist ideology has not been sufficiently clarified.

The first judgment of the author agrees on the whole with that of I. M. Bochenski in his book, *Das Sowjetrussische Dialektische Materialismus*, Bern, 1950. This is the other reliable work on Soviet philosophy available in western languages. In spite of the fact that the proponents of dialectical materialism have always waged a bitter war against all "mysticism," Dr. Wetter shows clearly that there are mystical elements inherent in the Russian form of dialectical materialism, elements which he believes to be of

Russian origin. In no country has Hegelianism been so enthusiastically received as in nineteenth century Russia. With the same enthusiasm, Lenin later adopted the Marxist form of Hegelianism. If an English translation of this entire book should be found impractical, it would be desirable to have Wetter's concluding remarks (pp. 567-589) translated and published in one of the American scholarly periodicals.

In reviewing the Italian edition of the book, the anti-Communist Socialist paper, *L'Umanita*, praised not only its unusual detachment and objectivity, but also pointed out that perhaps a Jesuit Father is best equipped to understand all the nuances of a philosophy which, like Russian dialectical materialism, is basically a form of religious mysticism. Soviet philosophers and Catholic theologians pursue the same, fundamentally theological, method. They do not ask whether a statement is in itself true or false but whether it is contained within the dogmatic authority. They do not argue *ex ratione*, but *ex auctoritate*. Though the answers which the present Soviet philosophy and Scholastic theology give are diametrically opposed, the problems posited are remarkably similar. "We do not think we exaggerate," Father Wetter writes, "when we affirm that dialectical materialism in its present official Soviet form has much more similarity with the Scholastic *forma mentis* than with the Hegelian dialectic, in spite of certain Hegelian expressions which are preserved but which are voided of the idealistic sense by a 'materialistic reversal' and which are filled instead with a meaning simply conforming to common sense." (p. 576) Father

Wetter even goes so far as to show that Soviet dialectical materialism claims certain concepts in the field of epistemology as its own, which are clearly of Thomistic origin. With a small change in one or the other of its fundamental conceptions, dialectical materialism could easily become Thomism. What separates them are not the aspects of a formal philosophy, but the differences of two opposed and opposite ways of salvation.

As a result of his profound knowledge of Russian philosophy and theology, Father Wetter has deepened our understanding of the fundamental character of Russian dialectical materialism.

HANS KOHN

The City College of New York

MEDLIN, WILLIAM K. *Moscow and East Rome. A Political Study of the Relations of Church and State in Muscovite Russia.* Geneva, Librairie E. Droz, 1952. 252 pp. 16 fr.

One of the most regrettable gaps in information available in the English language on Russian history concerns pre-Petrine, Muscovite, Russia. For, in a great many ways a study of this period is indispensable to a thorough understanding of eighteenth, nineteenth, and even twentieth century Russia. For this reason alone, the publication of Mr. Medlin's book should receive special attention. And the scholarly thoroughness and excellence of the work make it all the more commendable.

The author opens his investigation with a survey of the founding and growth of Constantinople—meeting

place of Eastern mysticism with Western rationalism—and sketches the evolution of the Byzantine institutions of State and Church, founded on the idea of symphonia, of complete accord between secular and ecclesiastical powers.

The main part of the book is devoted to tracing the relations of Church and State in Russia, from the introduction of Byzantine Christianity to the Principality of Kiev in the late tenth century to the abolition of the Patriarchate and secularization of the Church by Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century. Throughout the study, the rôle played by Byzantine ideas in molding Russian political and ideological concepts receives special attention.

During the Kiev period, the Byzantine theory and practice of interdependence of Church and State became a fundamental part of Russian life, the clergy declaring government to be a divine institution and supporting the state policy, the prince in return endowing the Church with grants and privileges.

The period which followed upon the disintegration of the Principality of Kiev—the age of Tartar domination and the early formative years of the state of Muscovy—is treated with disappointing brevity by Mr. Medlin, particularly where the central figure of the times, St. Sergius, is concerned. Neither St. Sergius' rôle in the Russian struggle against Tartar overlordship, nor his leading share in the rise of "desert" monasteries and ascetic monasticism is sufficiently discussed. Particularly the latter topic, St. Sergius' teaching of ascetic ideals, would have facilitated a better understanding of the next phase in church and state relationship dis-

cussed by Mr. Medlin—the controversy which arose at the turn of the fifteenth century between the followers of Joseph of Volokolamsk, defender of monastic wealth, and of Nil Sorsky, upholder of monastic asceticism. The author names these two camps the Nationalists and the Conservatives, in order better to stress the political doctrine of the winner in the dispute, Nationalist Joseph of Volokolamsk, on the inseparability of spiritual and temporal powers.

The following chapters dealing with seventeenth century Russia and Patriarch Nikon are the finest in the book. The strong, uncompromising personality of Nikon is vividly portrayed, his relationship to Tsar Alexis, his spectacular rise and dramatic fall make absorbing reading. Nikon strove to secure unconditional priestly authority, calling himself Great Sovereign, acting as a sovereign co-regent of the Tsar, sweeping aside the traditional Byzantine idea of mutual concord of Church and State. Nikon's downfall was motivated by the fact that his theory, divesting the Tsar of his sacred authority over spiritual matters, was too new and therefore unacceptable to Muscovite clerical—and lay—mentality, steeped, as it was, in ancient Byzantine tradition.

Yet, Nikon's theory indicated the possibility of conflict between ecclesiastical and political powers and contributed to Peter the Great's decision to forestall such conflicts and to establish imperial overlordship over the Church. By abolishing the Patriarchate and by instituting a new College for ecclesiastical affairs, Peter took the first step toward the establishment of a state church and a state religion, a road

which Russia continued to pursue in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Mr. Medlin's numerous bibliographical notes and references to French and German as well as Russian sources deserve special mention. They by far transcend the limits of the author's subject and provide a valuable source of information to any student of Russian history, be his field of particular interest social, cultural, economic, or political.

A few words should be added concerning the uneven style in which the book is written. Lucid and clearly phrased passages alternate with unnecessarily ponderous and awkwardly expressed ideas, thus reducing the overall readability of the work. But it can hardly be overstressed that the contents of the book more than compensate for these shortcomings in form of expression.

VALENTINE TSCHEBOTARIOFF BILL
Princeton University

ROUËT DE JOURNAL, M. J. *Monachisme et Monastères Russes*. Paris, Payot, 1952. 216 pp. 750 fr.

Every educated man is aware of western monasticism's leading rôle in the Middle Ages in the saving and diffusing of culture. The part played by monasticism in the Near East, in Greece, in Asia Minor, and in Egypt is not so well known. And Russian monasticism is practically a closed book for the western reader.

Yet the significance of Russia's monasteries was extraordinarily great. Amid the darkest storms and struggles, they shone like beacons of the faith and its practice, and

sustained the courage of Christian men in times of destruction and pagan domination. Just as in the West, the monks preserved, in their libraries, the priceless treasures of the ancient manuscripts; they recorded history in their chronicles; they translated and copied valuable works; they taught layfolk to read and write, they maintained the arts and crafts, and promoted internal trade. But their achievement did not end here. The Russian monks were also the principal apostles and missionaries among neighboring heathen tribes; they carried the faith to the vast unexplored lands of the East and North, colonizing and Christianizing them. The monks conquered these distant places, not with fire and sword, but with a flame of love and meekness and pity. In the monasteries, they tended the sick, especially in time of epidemics; they fed the hungry in the famine years; and in periods of sedition, war, and national emergency, the monasteries gave the government not only their moral but also their financial and material support. Every Russian bishop and metropolitan was a monk and the monasteries gave to the Russian Church the overwhelming majority of her great churchmen and her Saints.

All this is recounted for us in Father Rouët de Journel's book.

In the first part of the book the author deals with the origins, the nature, and the characteristics of Russian monasticism; in the later chapters he speaks of the more important and more typical monasteries. He begins with the most ancient, the Kiev-Pechersky Lavra, founded in the eleventh century, famous for its Chronicles and the catacombs with their innumerable

bodies of the Saints. He dwells longer on the Troitsko-Sergievsky Lavra, near Moscow, the citadel of Russian patriotism, which covered itself with military glory and was so closely connected with the throwing off of the Tartar yoke and with the defeat of the Poles in the Times of Trouble.

The following chapter is devoted to the Solovetsky Monastery in the far north, on the White Sea. Among other things this monastery is famous for its resistance by armed force, for as long as eight years, to the liturgical reforms of Patriarch Nikhon, and again in our days it became consecrated as the place of forced exile and suffering for the faith of thousands of bishops, priests, monks, and layfolk, who were persecuted by the Bolsheviks. The writer deals also with the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, founded by Peter the Great in his new capital of Petersburg, with its famous Theological Academy and its cemetery, which was a sort of pantheon of Imperial Russia and the necropolis of her heroes, statesmen, and renowned writers.

A concluding chapter is devoted to the Optina Pustyn, the fountainhead of Russian nineteenth century spirituality, so dear to Dostoevsky, Lev Tolstoy, K. Leontiev, Vladimir Soloviev, and many others. One more chapter is added, on the Russian monasteries of Mount Athos, especially the monastery of St. Panteleimon. These monasteries flourished and increased up until the Revolution. From Mount Athos, nine centuries ago, monastic rule was brought to Kiev, and today the last representatives of ancient Russian monasticism are still to be found on Mount Athos.

The author of this book is the

Director of the Centre d'Etudes Slaves at the Institut Catholique in Paris. He is well versed in the language and history of Russia and has been able to avail himself of original Russian sources. He is fully master of his subject, and has succeeded in presenting it in a work at once vivid, easy to read, and exceedingly compact. His book will be most valuable, indeed prescribed reading, for all who are interested in Russian spiritual life or in Russian history. It is well produced and enriched with a number of interesting illustrations.

N. Bock, S.J.

Fordham University
Russian Center

IVANOV, VYACHESLAV. *Freedom and the Tragic Life; A Study in Dostoevsky*. New York, The Noonday Press, 1952. 166 pp. \$3.50.

Ever since, some seventy years ago, Tolstoy, Nietzsche, and Robert Louis Stevenson were overwhelmed by Dostoevsky's elemental greatness, there has hardly been any writer or thinker of significance, who would not also have come under the spell of Dostoevsky. It would fill a sizable volume to list all the books, pamphlets, treatises, and articles on Dostoevsky which were written by essayists, philosophers of religion, psychologists, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts of the various schools, or by political writers of the Marxian or anti-Marxian school.

Recently a new study has been added to the great number of works which have been devoted to Dostoevsky. This book by Vyacheslav Ivanov holds an important place among the many publications on

Dostoevsky. It has the great advantage that the author, Ivanov, is not only a creative writer himself, but is related to Dostoevsky by a genuine spiritual kinship, which enables him to understand and interpret the very core of Dostoevsky's thoughts.

Furthermore, Ivanov, who had a thorough training in European philosophy and literature, is most competent to interpret Dostoevsky's world to the Western mind. For in spite of many penetrating studies by Gide, Virginia Woolf, Powys, Stefan Zweig, and Thomas Mann—Dostoevsky, the Russian, always remained somewhat alien to Western thought.

Ivanov paints a comprehensive picture of Dostoevsky's philosophy of life and his amazing psychological insight. He interprets Dostoevsky's religious concept, the mythological elements in Dostoevsky's work, and above all, he gives a masterful analysis of Dostoevsky's artistic technique, which he calls "the novel-tragedy."

The feature which distinguished Dostoevsky from all the great realists of his era, novelists such as Stendhal, Balzac, Dickens, Hawthorne, Zola, Turgenev, and Tolstoy, is the strong dramatic quality of his works. All his literary contemporaries conformed to the epical step-by-step narration. They were mostly concerned with putting down all the *petits faits vrais* of life. To them the novel was, as Stendhal put it: "un miroir qui se promène sur une grande route." Dostoevsky's novels don't conjure up the past in epic narrative, but they portray the present with dramatic immediacy. While in other works of fiction the major events take years to develop, Dostoevsky condenses the whole process of develop-

ment within a few days or even hours. The tragedy of *Brothers Karamazov* is crammed into a few days, and all the tragic events in *The Idiot* happen between morning and midnight. Sometimes a single dialogue contains the abundance of a whole life. This gives Dostoevsky's novels the structure of tragedies.

We make the acquaintance of most of Dostoevsky's characters when they are violently agitated, when they have had disastrous collisions with the world or with themselves, when their feelings have reached the boiling point and drive them toward crime or madness.

Dostoevsky's method, to begin with the effect rather than the cause, is the basic principle of the classical drama. The action which follows in a series of eruptions serves the same purpose as the technique of suspense used by the great tragic dramatists. The sparseness of his descriptions appears to be in accordance with Aristotle's dramatic precepts. Dostoevsky conforms to the rules of tragedy not only where he disregards the canon of the epic, but where he goes beyond it. His descriptions of places and of the looks and clothes of his characters are usually no longer than a brief stage direction. On the other hand, the brooding tortuous monologues of his heroes recall Hamlet, and the monologues and choruses in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. It is

no accident that when the Moscow Art Theater staged several scenes from *Brothers Karamazov* it was able to use the actual text of the novel without any changes.

The dramatic element in Dostoevsky's novels has been mentioned by a number of interpreters of Dostoevsky's writings, among others by Powys and by the existentialist Albert Camus, who drew "a direct line from Sophocles' King Oedipus to Dostoevsky's Kirilov." Yet, to my knowledge, the connection between the tragedies of the ancients and Dostoevsky's novel-tragedy has nowhere been as clearly and convincingly presented as in Ivanov's book. This alone should make Ivanov's book a "must" which no scholar or admirer of Dostoevsky ought to miss.

The outstanding qualities of Ivanov's interpretation of Dostoevsky inspire the wish that Ivanov's other writings be translated into English, which would certainly prove an enrichment for those who are interested in Russian literature. Ivanov started his literary career in Russia as a symbolist poet, and was nicknamed "Viacheslav the Magnificent" by Berdyaev. He left Russia in 1922 and settled in Italy, where he continued his work which grew and matured until his death in 1949.

RENÉ FUELOEP-MILLER

Dartmouth College

SYRACUSE Books About Russia and the Soviets

THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET SATELLITES

PETER MEYER, EUGENE DUSCHINSKY,
BERNARD D. WEINRYB, NICOLAS SYLVAIN

Authoritative studies on Jewish life in the Soviet satellites: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, from pre-war days through the Nazi occupation, the war, and present-day Communist regimes. 648 pages, \$6.50

THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION

SOLOMON M. SCHWARZ

A study of the minority problems in the USSR with special reference to the Jews. A definitive study highly praised by reviewers. The author is a well-known expert on the USSR. 380 pages, \$5.00

COMMUNIST DOCTRINE AND THE FREE WORLD

MARGUERITE J. FISHER

Here are assembled from the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin the basic tenets of Communist ideology. The material is organized under 16 topics which clearly show what the Party line is today. 294 pages, \$4.50

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE, OR SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

YALE

THE MONGOLS and RUSSIA

by George Vernadsky

A new interpretation of Russia's internal life and international position in the age of Mongol expansion in the thirteenth century. Volume III in *A History of Russia*

by Vernadsky and Karpovich. \$7.50

Volume I—Ancient Russia \$6.00

Volume II—Kievan Russia \$6.00

At your bookseller

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

New Haven, Connecticut

A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY

in two volumes

V. V. ZENKOVSKY, Translated by GEORGE L. KLINE. This, the only complete history of Russian philosophy in any language, has been widely acclaimed as the most readable and reliable yet written. The English translation, which includes the author's latest revisions and additions, is written in a clear, direct style, with a minimum of technical terminology. The author's sensitive but dispassionate treatment of the views of Russian philosophers is based on an extensive study of sources not generally available in Western languages.

"The second volume fully justifies the expectations aroused in the reader by the first volume. . . . The book as a whole must be regarded as an outstanding phenomenon."—D. I. Chizhevski in *Novy Zhurnal* two volumes \$15.00

Alexander Pushkin's BORIS GODUNOV

Russian Text with Translation
and Notes by Philip L. Barbour

The first complete presentation of Pushkin's classic with English and Russian parallel texts, this edition is particularly valuable for students of literature, Russian, and linguistics. The English and Russian texts match on facing pages. The Introduction and notes are clear, useful, and scholarly. An appendix contains scenes usually omitted from standard texts. \$3.00

A MODERN CZECH GRAMMAR

WILLIAM E. HARKINS, Assisted by MARIE HNYKOVA. This all-purpose elementary Czech grammar for college students has several unique features. Because it requires a vocabulary of only 1,200 words, it can be used by students without a Slavic background. Czech sentence order and verbs are treated far more completely than heretofore, and there are more exercises than in any other existing Czech grammar. Designed for self-study, the grammar contains an index of derivative forms not found in dictionaries. *A King's Crown Press publication.* \$4.50

Columbia Slavic Studies
of the Department of Slavic Languages, Columbia University,
Ernest J. Simmons, General Editor,
are available from the address below.
Write for brochure.

Columbia University Press

SOVIET NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT IN 1937

ABRAM BERGSON. This penetrating theoretical economic analysis calculates the national income and product of the Soviet Union in 1937, giving new and deep insights into its economy. The author, using all available sources, sets up a new methodology for analyzing such statistics. *"This study is probably the most significant work on the Soviet economy that has been written so far in English."*—Alexander Gerschenkron, Professor of Economics, Harvard University

\$3.75

THROUGH THE GLASS OF SOVIET LITERATURE

Views of Russian Society

ERNEST J. SIMMONS, Editor. These six studies of different aspects of Soviet literature offer a new approach to an understanding of significant phases of Soviet society. Highly readable and informative, they show Russian society reflected in its literature, from the Revolution of 1917 to 1952. These phases are: controls over literature, the Marxian woman, the Jew in Soviet literature, children's drama, Soviet satirists, and post-war literary scholarship.

\$4.50

THE PROLETARIAN EPISODE IN RUSSIAN LITERATURE 1928-1932

EDWARD J. BROWN examines the proletarian literary movement in Russia—particularly the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers. He discusses the group's literary theory, the kind of literature it produced, its effect on Russian literature, and the reasons it was liquidated.

\$4.50

MANAGEMENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL FIRM IN THE USSR

A Study in Soviet Economic Planning

DAVID GRANICK'S study of how the Soviet planning system integrates the thousands of industrial plants in the USSR shows that plant managers have greater entrepreneurial powers than is generally supposed. He analyzes the role of top management, showing where plant executives play a direct role, describing their characteristics as a group, their special problems, and the institutional structure within which they work.

probable price, \$5.00

2960 Broadway, New York 27

Publishers of *The American Slavic & East European Review*



Books in Russian

The Chekhov Publishing House offers a wide range of books in the Russian language including Russian classics not available in Soviet Editions; new works by emigre writers; historical memoirs; personal experiences of recent escapees; books on Russian History and Civilization; Russian translations of representative American books. Following is a list of some of the books available at Russian bookstores or through the publishing house:

| | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|------------------|
| Alexander Bogolepov—Anthology of Classical Poetry—From Zhukowski to Bunin | 416 pp. | \$2.75 |
| George Fedotov—The New City—Essays—Introduction by George Ivask | 382 pp. | \$2.75 |
| Alexis Goldenweiser—In Defense of the Law | 272 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Juri Jelagin—Taming of the Arts | 436 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Constantine Krypton—The Siege of Leningrad | 256 pp. | \$2.00 |
| Julius Margolin—The Journey to the Country Zc-Ka | 416 pp. | \$2.75 |
| Vladimir Markov—Stilled Voices—Poetry Behind the Iron Curtain | 416 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Michael Novikov—From Moscow to New York—Memoirs | 416 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Mikhail Ossorguine—Letters about Insignificant Things—Essays | 416 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Prof. Sergei Prokopovich—The Economy of the Soviet Union | Vol. I 400 pp. Vol. II 360 pp. | \$3.25 \$3.25 |
| Solomon Schwarz—Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union | 272 pp. | \$2.25 |
| Ariadna Tyrkova-Williams—Ways Toward Freedom—Memoirs | 432 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Fedor Tyutchev—Selected Poems | 272 pp. | \$2.00 |
| Wladimir Weidle—The Evening—Essays | 224 pp. | \$2.00 |
| R. V. Ivanov-Razumnik—Prisons and Exiles | 416 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Yuri Terapiano—The Emigre Montparnasse | 208 pp. | \$1.75 |
| Maria Bock—My Father, Peter Stolypin | 352 pp. | \$2.75 |
| Nicholas Lossky—Dostoyevski and his Christian World Concept | 416 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Victor Chernov—Before the Storm | 416 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Anton Denikin—The Road of a Russian Officer | 384 pp. | \$2.75 |
| James Truslow Adams—Epic of America—Translation | 416 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Nikolai Valentinoff—Encounters with Lenin | 384 pp. | \$3.00 |
| Princess Olga Troubetskoy—Prince Serge Troubetskoy—A Sister's Memoirs | 272 pp. | \$2.25 |
| Boris Vycheslavtzeff—Crisis of Industrial Culture | 352 pp. | \$2.75 |
| Ivan Elagin—Journey From There | 168 pp. | \$1.50 |
| Marc Slonim—The Three Loves of Dostoyevsky | 320 pp. | \$2.50 |
| Alexandra Tolstoy—Father | Vol. I 416 pp. Vol. II 416 pp. | \$2.75 \$2.75 |

CHEKHOV PUBLISHING HOUSE
OF THE EAST EUROPEAN FUND, INC.
387 Fourth Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.

**RUSSIA REVEALED . . . in two of
the most extensive studies ever published!**

RUSSIA:

A History and an Interpretation

by Michael T. Florinsky

This vast panorama of more than 1,000 years of Russian history makes these two volumes the most readily available history in English about Russia. From the earliest barbarian tribes that eventually formed the small Russian state, through century after century of war and conquest, of Tartar domination, of absolute rule under the Tsars during which Russia's power was extended from the Baltic to the Pacific; through the Revolution of 1917 and

the beginning of the Communist regime . . . here, the forces that determined the course of Russia's history are made evident to you. Every phase of the country's growth is explored—social, economic, political, and cultural. This objective, comprehensive work is an indispensable reference and a definite contribution toward better world understanding.

Maps Boxed

2 volumes—1,568 pages \$15.00

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 1917-1923

Volume III: Soviet Russia and the World

by E. H. Carr

Soviet Russia and The World completes the first part of Professor Carr's huge project—a complete history of the Soviet Union. Volumes I and II treated internal and economic questions. This volume probes early Soviet policy, not radically changed today, toward the outside world. The narrative analyzes the complexities of Soviet foreign policy, which were due partly to Russia's geographical position as both a European and an Asiatic

power, partly to the dilemma, especially acute during those early years, of having to strike a balance between the attempt to promote world revolution and the desire to establish normal diplomatic relations with capitalist governments. Professor Carr has used the best available sources, many of them in the original Russian, and the result is a complete picture of the intellectual and psychological turmoil in Soviet Russia at that time. \$6.00

at all bookstores or write

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

"For all American libraries
and all American readers
interested in Russian writ-
ing."

—Chicago Tribune

Modern Russian Literature

From Chekhov to the Present

By MARC SLONIM

author of *The Epic of Russian Literature
from Its Origins through Tolstoy*

This is the first survey of modern Russian literature which relates a broad picture of individual writers and literary movements to the political, social, and moral ideas that have shaped the Soviet Union. Mr. Slonim is one of the best-informed present-day critics of Russian literature and his two books comprise a fresh and impartial interpretation of Russian thought as well as the most up-to-date and authoritative study of one of the world's great literatures.

"Mr. Slonim has shown great skill in preserving a proper balance between the different aspects of his subject. He is equally good in discussing ideas and literary values and in relating them to the social background."—*New York Times*

\$6.80

At all bookstores

OXFORD UNIVERSITY
PRESS

114 Fifth Avenue,
New York 11, N. Y.



Notice to subscribers of
THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Change of Address

The Review's address has been changed
and henceforth it will be:

**235 Baker Library
Hanover, N. H.**

New subscription rates

It has been necessary to raise subscription rates. Effective January 1, 1954 (with Volume 19) the rates will be as follows: 1 year: \$5.00 in the U. S.; \$5.50 in Canada; \$6.00 foreign. Single issues (through Vol. 18) \$1.00; subsequent single issues, \$1.25. Cumulative Index to Vol. 1-10 (Nov. 1941-Oct. 1951) 75¢ per copy.

Former rates will prevail on all subscriptions entered prior to Nov. 1, 1953.